Critique of Pure Risk Assessment or, Kant Meets Tarasoff by Mossman, Douglas, MD
University of Cincinnati College of Law
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications
Faculty Articles and Other Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2006
Critique of Pure Risk Assessment or, Kant Meets
Tarasoff
Douglas Mossman MD
University of Cincinnati College of Law, douglas.mossman@uc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Psychiatry and Psychology Commons, and the Psychology and Psychiatry Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles and Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Cincinnati
College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact ken.hirsh@uc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mossman, Douglas MD, "Critique of Pure Risk Assessment or, Kant Meets Tarasoff " (2006). Faculty Articles and Other Publications.
Paper 24.
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs/24
HeinOnline -- 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 523 2006-2007
CRITIQUE OF PURE RISK ASSESSMENT 
OR, 
KANT MEETS TARASOFF 
Douglas Mossman, MD. * 
ABSTRACT 
This Article takes a "critical" approach to the assumptions underlying 
current practices of violence risk assessment. The Article first 
explicates a fundamental difference between how mental health 
researchers now interpret the phrase "violence prediction" and how 
they understood that phrase in the 1970s. Applying a "critical" 
approach, the Article then shows that courts and mental health 
professionals may need to abandon the hope that more accurate 
methods of predicting violence will help clinicians make better 
decisions about potential violence. Although this result may seem 
disappointing, it can liberate mental health professionals from 
regarding patients as statistical sources of risk and can encourage 
them to treat patients instead as sources of initiative and moral worth. 
The Article then provides a moral and legal framework for 
reformulating the Tarasoff rule. Taking the view that 
consequentialist, predictive approaches to formulating the duty to 
protect are ethically questionable (as well as scientifically 
impractical), the Article suggests that assigning therapists a duty to 
intervene in response to a patient's explicit, credible threat is 
consistent with the view that patients (along with other humans) ought 
to be treated not merely as means, but always as ends in themselves. 
* Professor and Director, Division of Forensic Psychiatry, Wright State University Boonshoft 
School of Medicine; Administrative Director, Glenn M. Weaver Institute of Psychiatry and Law, 
University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.A. 1976, Oberlin College; M.D. 1981, University of 
Michigan Medical School. The author thanks Michael L. Perlin, Kathleen J. Hart, Glenn M. Weaver, 
Victor Knapp, and Jerald Kay for their advice and support. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Importance oJTarasoff 
On March 17, 2006, the Glenn M. Weaver Institute of Law and 
Psychiatry of the University of Cincinnati College of Law marked the 
three decades since issuance of the Tarasoffdecision' with a symposium 
entitled, "The Future of the 'Duty to Protect': Scientific and Legal 
Perspectives on Tarasojj's Thirtieth Anniversary." I had the honor of 
being among the speakers who gave presentations to the symposium's 
attendees, and this Article, along with others that appear in this issue of 
the University oj Cincinnati Law Review, expands upon my oral 
remarks. 
Because I am an academic psychiatrist who devotes most of his 
professional attention to forensic issues, it seems "just natural" to me to 
take special note of any "significant" anniversary of Tarasoff. Yet I 
recognize that persons from other disciplines or with other 
perspectives-that is, most readers of this Article-may not share this 
sentiment. For them, it may seem 'just natural" to ask, "Why should an 
Institute of Law and Psychiatry devote an entire symposium to the 
thirtieth anniversary of Tarasoff?" At least two good reasons suggest 
themselves. 
1. Tarasojj's Impact 
First, thirty years after its promulgation, Tarasoff remains, to mental 
health professionals, the most influential ruling in mental disability law? 
One might argue that the Jackson3 -0 'Connor4 line of cases and the 
I. I refer specifically to the second TarasojJ decision, issued on July I, 1976. Tarasoff v. 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). The California Supreme Court issued its first 
TarasojJ decision on December 23, 1974. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 
1974). In general, when this article refers to the TarasojJ decision, rule, or doctrine (without 
qualification), it is the second and ultimate decision that is being designated. When it is necessary to 
distinguish between the two, the Article follows the custom of calling the 1974 decision "TarasojJ f' and 
the 1976 decision "TarasojJll." 
2. "Tarasoff ... represents one of the most significant developments in medico-legal 
jurisprudence of the past century .... The original case ... in 1974 burst like a bomb over the clinical 
scene." Thomas G. Gutheil, Moral Justification for Tarasoff-Type Warnings and Breach of 
Confidentiality: A Clinician's Perspective, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 345, 345 (2001). 
3. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (subjecting petitioner to a more lenient commitment 
standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to other persons not 
charged with offenses violated equal protection clause; indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant 
solely because of his incompetence to stand trial violated due process). 
4. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (a state may not constitutionally confine, 
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Forcf-Penrl-Atkins7 line of cases are more significant in that they address 
the liberty or life-and-death concerns of persons with mental disabilities, 
and therefore must be far more important than a tort issue that involves 
mere monetary damages.8 Without minimizing the significance of these or 
other cases, however, Tarasoff outranks them in several respects, at least as 
far as mental health professionals are concerned. Although some of the 
death penalty cases generate more legal citations or "hits" on Google,9 
queries of the PsycInfo and Web of Sciencelo databases show that articles 
mentioning or citing Tarasoff vastly outnumber articles that refer to the 
other cases, II providing vivid testimony to the unique impact of Tarasoff on 
law-and-mental-health scholarship. 
without more, a non-dangerous individual who could survive safely in the community by himself or with 
assistance from willing and responsible family members or friends). 
5. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (l986) (Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from 
inflicting the death penalty upon a prisoner who is "insane"). 
6. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (jury must, upon request, receive instructions that 
allow them to give effect to mental retardation as mitigating evidence in determining whether to impose 
the death penalty, but the Eighth Amendment does not categorically prohibit the execution of mentally 
retarded capital murderers). 
7. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (executing mentally retarded criminals constitutes 
"cruel and unusual punishment" and is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment). 
8. For this observation, I am indebted to Professor Perlin. He elaborates a bit on this comment 
in Michael L. Perlin, "You Got No Secrets to Conceal": Considering the Application of the Tarasoff 
Doctrine A broad, 75 U. ON. L. REv. 611 (2006). 
9. Here are the results of my February 22, 2006 web searches and "unrestricted" 
Shepardizations using the Lexis database: 
Case (search Qhrase) Google Hits Citations 
TarasofJv. Regents 18,500 1,604 
Jackson v. Regents 12,800 1,381 
O'Connor v. Donaldson 14,800 1,438 
Ford v. Wainwright 28,400 1,123 
Penry v. Lynaugh 41,400 2,283 
Atkins v. Virginia 62,000 1,200 
10. PsyclNFO covers titles, authors, and abstracts of worldwide professional and academic 
publications in psychology and related publications in medicine, psychiatry, nursing, sociology, 
education, pharmacology, physiology, and linguistics. The database used for this search covers the 
years 1967 to early 2006. The Web of Science indexes publications from 5,900 major journals in more 
than 150 scientific disciplines (including mental-health-related fields such as psychiatry and 
neuroscience, and frequently, law review articles), with all cited references captured. The database used 
for this search covered the years 1980 to early 2006. 
II. Results of my February 22, 2006 searches ofPsycInfo and Web of Science databases: 
Case (search Qhrase) Psxclnfo Web of Science 
TarasofJ 569 146 
Jackson v. Indiana 3 2 
O'Connor v. Donaldson 50 2 
Ford v. Wainwright 36 5 
Penry v. Lynaugh 34 4 
Atkins v. Virginia 58 9 
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Moreover, no court ruling has had a broader or more enduring impact 
on day-to-day mental health practice. A minority of mental health 
professionals deals with individuals who face civil commitment, and 
very few clinicians evaluate or treat individuals potentially subject to 
capital punishment. But rare is the practicing mental health professional 
who is not acquainted with the Tarasoff decision and the discomfort that 
arises in clinical situations that trigger a duty to protect.
12 
Because of 
the Tarasoff decision in California and its legal "progeny,,13 in other 
U.S. jurisdictions, mental health clinicians across the country regularly 
break confidentiality and take other actions to prevent patients from 
harming members of the public. 
The influence of Tarasoff in mental health practice goes beyond 
therapists' mere knowledge of the case to permeate their current views 
of what mental health clinicians ought to do as part of their everyday 
practice.
14 
Psychotherapists accept the fact that, while they may regard 
themselves as the care-givers of individual patients, they sometimes 
must function as agents for social protection.
15 
Mental health clinicians 
12. For example: I have been teaching psychiatry residents for nearly two decades. In a talk that 
I give each year to first·year residents, I ask how many of them have heard of Tarasoff. I have 
encountered just one resident (out of the more-than-200 whom I've asked) who had not already heard of 
the case. In 1996, Professor Monahan observed that "TarasofJ . .. has become a familiar part of the 
clinical landscape." John Monahan, Violence Prediction: The Past Twenty and the Next Twenty Years, 
23 CRIM. JUST. BEHAV. 107, 110 (1996) [hereinafter Monahan, Twenty Years]. See also Samuel Knapp 
& Leon VandeCreek, Real-life Vignettes Involving the Duty to Protect, I J. PSYCHOTHERAPY INDEP. 
PRAC., 83, 83 (2000) (discussing "the widespread acceptance of the duty to protect ... and ... three 
common dilemmas faced by psychotherapists" related to the duty). 
13. Although it is common now to encounter references to the "TarasofJ progeny," the first 
publication that appears to have done so is ALAN A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY: 
ESSAYS AND ANALYSIS 161 (Am. Psychiatric Press 1984). 
14. "[N]o court decision in the last generation has succeeded in so raising the anxieties of mental 
health professionals. The ill-defined nature of the duty to protect has led to great confusion about 
clinicians' obligations." Paul S. Appelbaum et aI., Statutory Approaches to Limiting Psychiatrists' 
Liability for Their Patients' Violent Acts, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 821, 821 (1989). Professor Monahan 
observes, "The duty to protect, in short, is now a fact of professional life for nearly all American 
clinicians ... " Monahan, Twenty Years, supra note 12, at Ill. 
15. A few courts have rejected Tarasoff. See, e.g., Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 
1999) (no duty to warn where Texas Health and Safety Code mandates confidentiality); Gregory v. 
Kilbride, 565 S.E.2d 685 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (North Carolina does not recognize a psychiatrist's duty 
to warn third persons); Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So.2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (psychiatrist who 
has no right or ability to control a voluntary outpatient's behavior can not be held liable for failure to 
warn the patient's victim). 
Nonetheless, mental health professionals see TarasofJ as establishing a national standard. See, e.g., 
JAMES BECK, The Psychotherapist and the Violent Patient, in THE POTENTIALLY VIOLENT PATIENT AND 
THE TARASOFF DECISION IN PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 9, 33 (James Beck ed., 1985); Alan Felthous, Duty 
to Warn or Protect: Current Statusfor Psychiatrists, 21 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 591 (1991). 
See also American Psychiatric Association, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH 
ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY, Section 4, No.8, http://www.psych.orgl 
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do not explicitly think about stopping violence during every treatment 
encounter, but the implicit obligation to protect the public is present in 
every clinical contact l6-something Justice Clark noted in his dissent in 
Tarasoffl7 Not surprisingly, therefore, seminars on how to manage 
potential Tarasoff liability remain among the most popular and best 
attended of the continuing education offerings available to mental health 
professionals. 18 Books dealing with liability prevention and violence 
prediction frequently receive awards from forensic mental health 
professionals' organizations. 19 
The Tarasoffdoctrine's influence on legal decision-makers consists of 
more than just numbers of citations. It also manifests itself in how 
courts view the social role of mental health professionals. The notion 
that public protection is the raison d'etre of patients' interactions with 
psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental health clinicians is vividly 
exemplified by the Ohio Supreme Court's 1997 statement that "the 
relationship between the psychotherapist and the patient in the outpatient 
setting constitutes a special relation justifying the imposition of a duty 
psychJlract/ethics/ppaethics.cfm (last visited Jan. 8, 2006): "When, in the clinical judgment of the 
treating psychiatrist. the risk of danger is deemed to be significant, the psychiatrist may reveal 
confidential infonnation disclosed by the patient. "; and American Psychological Association, ETHICAL 
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT, Section 4.05(b), http://www.apa.org/ethics/ 
code2002.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2006): "Psychologists disclose confidential infonnation without the 
consent of the individual only as mandated by law, or where pennitted by law for a valid purpose such 
as to ... protect the client/patient, psychologist, or others from hann ... ". 
16. "Medical students and psychiatric residents are commonly taught to assess for 'homicidal 
ideation' as a part of a psychiatric work-up .... " David M. Gellennan & Robert Suddath, Violent 
Fantasy, Dangerousness, and the Duty to Warn and Protect, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 484, 484 
(2005). 
In psychiatric hospital charts that I read in my clinical work, I commonly encounter daily progress 
notes in which medical students or residents write, "Q S/I, HlI, AlH, V/H," physician short-hand for "no 
suicidal ideation, homicidal ideation, auditory hallucinations, or visual hallucinations." The last two 
entries usually are relevant entries for a previously psychotic patient, but the first two entries reflect 
efforts to avert liability, should the patient hann himself or herself or someone else. 
17. "Now, confronted by the majority's new duty, the psychiatrist must instantaneously calculate 
potential violence from each patient on each visit." Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d 334, 361 (Cal. 1976)(Clark, J., 
dissenting). 
18. In the week before the March 17,2006, Tarasoffsymposium, I received two brochures about 
(among other topics) "risk assessment of the mentally ill individual" in my postal mail. For additional 
examples, see http://www.specializedtraining.com/seminars.htm (last visited Mar. 15,2006). 
19. Examples include the following winners of the Manfred S. Guttmacher Award, cosponsored 
by the American Psychiatric Association and the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law: JOHN 
MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981); JAMES C. BECK, 
CONFIDENTIALITY VERSUS THE DUTY TO PROTECT: FORESEEABLE HARM IN THE PRACTICE OF 
PSYCHIATRY (1990); JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR 
STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001). A full 
listing of Guttmacher Awardees appears at http://www.psych.org/public_info/librJlubVguttmacher.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2006). 
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upon the psychotherapist to protect against and/or control the patient's 
violent propensities. ,,20 Despite the traditional common law position 
that exempts individuals from liability for the easily preventable acts of 
others,21 courts have expanded the Tarasoff doctrine in many directions, 
to include protective obligations related from risks posed by mentally 
disabled drivers22 and by medical patients who may transmit Hly23 or 
other infectious diseases.24 
2. Scientific Advances 
A second reason to mark the thirtieth anniversary of Tarasoff is that 
this decision remains the inspiration for ongoing scholarship in the areas 
of violence prevention, risk assessment, and communication about risks. 
The result is that we have much better knowledge than we possessed in 
the 1970s concerning these subjects and other areas of scientific study 
that relate directly to the core concerns of Tarasoff.25 From the vantage 
20. Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1327 (1997). Five years 
before Morgan's blunt statement, Professor Monahan had noted: 
Throughout history and in all known societies, people have believed that mental disorder 
and violence were somehow related .... [T]here can be little doubt that this assumption 
has played an animating role in the prominence of dangerous to others as a criterion for 
civil commitment and the commitment of persons acquitted of crime by reason of 
insanity, in the creation of special statutes for the extended detention of mentally 
disordered prisoners, and in the imposition of tort liability on psychologists and 
psychiatrists who fail to anticipate the violence of their patients. 
John Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 511 (1992). 
21. "This is true although the actor realizes that he has the ability to control the conduct of a third 
person, and could do so with only the most trivial of efforts and without any inconvenience to himself." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). 
22. Schuster v. Aitenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. 1988) (psychiatrist could be liable for damages 
resulting from his patient's auto accident). 
23. Reisner v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (failure to 
inform patient led to actionable transmission of HIV). 
24. Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1993) (failure to inform concerning diagnosis 
and symptoms of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever could be basis for wrongful death action). 
25. Writing at the twentieth anniversary of Tarasoff, Professor Monahan observed: 
Twenty years ago, American law asked very different questions about violence prediction 
than it does today. The methodologies by which social scientists went about answering 
those questions were unlike those in current use, and the conclusions drawn by the 
researchers were not the same as those drawn now. 
Monahan, Twenty Years. supra note 12, at 107. Before Tarasoff, concerns about the constitutionality of 
detaining mentally ill persons framed both the legal questions asked about violence prediction and the 
way mental health professionals thought about detention. After TarasofJ, "[I]iability, rather than 
constitutionality" became "the concern that motivate[d] interest in the prediction of violence .... " [d. at 
Ill. 
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point of the past thirty years of research on violence prediction, we can 
ask whether that knowledge should reshape our views about therapists' 
duties in fact situations similar to those that faced the therapists who 
treated Tatiana Tarasoffs eventual killer. Put another way, we can ask 
whether and how our current knowledge about assessing the risk of 
violence-and our remaining areas of ignorance-should influence and 
infonn courts' fonnulations of psychotherapists' duties or the policies 
enacted through legislation regarding psychiatric patients and their 
potential risk to the public. We can also ask whether available scientific 
knowledge about violence prediction should influence the attitudes 
about risk assessment held by mental health professionals who serve 
potentially violent clients. We can speculate about what advances in 
violence prediction mental health professionals and legal decision-
makers might expect in coming decades, about the limits on such 
advances, and about what such limits imply for clinicians' efforts to 
predict and limit their patients' violent behavior. 
Finally, Tarasoff in California and its progeny in other states have 
resulted in action by many state legislatures to define and limit duty-to-
protect obligations only to situations where patients have made explicit 
threats.26 We can ask whether, given our scientific knowledge, these 
statutes appropriately address the policy rationale-the perceived need 
to protect the public from the danger posed by mentally ill persons-that 
justified Tarasoff 
B. The Goals of This Article 
This Article has two major goals. First, it explicates a fundamental 
difference between how mental health researchers interpret the phrase 
"violence prediction" now and how they understood that phrase in the 
1970s. In fact, this development is so fundamental that researchers now 
use the phrase "violence risk assessment" to refer to the kinds of 
activities that they called "violence prediction" a few decades ago. 
Because I shall be examining our understanding of the underlying 
properties of risk assessment-absent the empirical content of particular 
individuals' risks for violence or any particular method of assessing 
26. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-517.02, CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92, COL. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-21-117, 16 DEL. CODE ANN. § 5402, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.059, IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 6-1901 ET SEQ., 405 ILL. COMPo STAT. 516-103, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.400, LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:2800.2, MD. CODE ANN. 5-6 § 5-609, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 36A, MICH. COMPo LAWS 
ANN. § 330.1946, MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-1102, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 329:31, N. J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A:62A-17, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.51, TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-3-207, UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-14A-IOI, VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2400, and WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.120. 
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those risks-, I have titled the Article "Critique of Pure Risk 
Assessment," in playful (and possibly grandiose) homage to the 
approach that Immanuel Kant adopted for contemplating questions of 
metaphysics.27 
My analogy to Kant goes a step further: a "critical" approach to the 
problem of violence prediction leads us to important conclusions, one of 
which is that we may need to abandon the hope that more accurate 
methods of predicting violence or assessing patients' level of violence 
risk will prove useful to practicing clinicians. Abandoning this hope 
may be cause for initial disappointment. But if courts and my mental 
health colleagues agree with my conclusion, abandoning the hope for 
useful risk assessments will ultimately liberate28 us from obligations that 
we cannot carry out rationally, and will allow us to refocus our attention 
on treating patients. Just as Kant believed that his critical philosophy 
would limit speculative reason and thereby remove an obstacle that 
would otherwise preclude "an absolutely necessary practical 
employment of pure reason" (the grasping of moral issues),29 I hope that 
a critique of pure risk assessment will liberate mental health 
professionals from regarding patients as statistical sources of risk so that 
we can approach patients instead as sources of initiative and moral 
worth. 
27. In this Article, citations to English translations of Kant's works follow this scheme: 
"KrV" = KRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT (1781/87), translated in CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 
(Norman Kemp Smith trans., S1. Martin's Press 1965). 
"MAR" = Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Rechtslehre (1797), translated in The Metaphysical 
Elements of Justice (John Ladd's trans., Macmillan 1965). 
"SRTL" = On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Altruistic Motives (1797), in KANT'S CRITIQUE OF 
PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY OF ETHICS 361 (T.K. Abbott trans., 1889), 
available at http://oll.libertyfund.orgIHome3/ Book.php?recordID=0435. 
"KpR" = KRITIK DER PRAKTISCHEN VERNUNFT (3rd ed. 1788), translated in CRITIQUE OF 
PRACTICAL REASON (Lewis White Beck trans., Macmillan 1993). 
"GMS" = Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), translated in GROUNDWORK OF THE 
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H. J. Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964). 
"MS" = DIE METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN (1797), translated in THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (Mary 
Gregor trans., Cambridge University Press 1996). 
Un bracketed page numbers refer to pagination in the above English translations. Bracketed page 
numbers apply the standard method of reference to Kant's writings, using pagination in the Kiiniglich 
preuf3ische Akademie der Wissenschaften edition of KANTS GESAMMEL TE SCHRIFTEN. 
28. For the notion that this insight can be "liberating," I am indebted to Dr. Robert Simon, who 
made this comment about one of my previous expressions of these ideas. See Douglas Mossman, How a 
Rabbi's Sermon Resolved My Tarasoff Conflict, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L 359 (2004) 
[hereinafter Mossman, Rabbi's Sermon]. 
29. KrV supra note 27, at 26 [B xxv]. 
HeinOnline -- 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 531 2006-2007
2006] KANT MEETS TARASOFF 531 
This leads to this Article's second goal: the description of a moral and 
legal framework for reformulating the TarasofJrule. Here, my approach 
is explicitly Kantian. Taking the view that consequentialist, predictive 
approaches to formulating the duty to protect are ethically questionable 
(as well as scientifically impractical), I suggest that assigning therapists 
a duty to intervene in response to a patient's explicit, credible threat is 
consistent with the view that patients (along with other humans) ought to 
be treated not merely as means, but always as ends in themselves. 
My argument proceeds as follows. In Section II, I recount the facts30 
behind the lawsuit that led to the TarasofJ decisions, and summarize key 
points of the California Supreme Court's ultimate ruling.3l Although the 
main "story" behind Tarasoff is well known to most mental health 
clinicians, some of the case's motivating facts may be unfamiliar to legal 
audiences and younger mental health clinicians who have "grown up" 
professionally with Tarasoff. Moreover, although the facts behind the 
case may well have justified a potentially more effective action to 
protect Tatiana Tarasoff (i.e., warning her) than the defendant therapists 
took, I also think that the California Supreme Court should have arrived 
at a different "major premise" under which, given the facts of the case, a 
warning was obligatory. Thus, understanding the facts behind TarasofJ 
is crucial to understanding the standard that the California Supreme 
Court should have formulated and the standard to which mental health 
professionals should be held. 
Section III describes what TarasofJ implies about therapists' 
competing obligations and the structure of therapists' knowledge about 
future violence by their patients. Section IV discusses how researchers 
conceptualized knowledge about future violence when TarasofJ was 
issued and compares this to how researchers now think about 
anticipating and predicting future violence. Section V describes an 
implication of this new conceptualization: it is nearly impossible to 
achieve agreement on how and when to implement the duty-to-protect as 
TarasofJ defines it, because the ruling includes a duty to know whether 
an undefinable threshold probability of violence has been reached. 
Section VI provides a Kantian perspective on the issues raised by the 
clinical encounter that brought about Tarasoff. Section VII uses this 
perspective to argue for defining the duty to protect as a duty to respond 
to things that a patient has said and done. Section VIII summarizes the 
30. I present the facts as they exist in published court accounts. Although many forensic mental 
health professionals know additional information about the case, I have no personal knowledge 
concerning any of the parties involved in the criminal or civil cases discussed here. 
31. That is, TarasofJ II, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
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Article's arguments and describes their implications for legal decision-
makers and clinicians. 
II. THE TARASOFF DECISION REVISITED 
A. Events Leading to the Lawsui?2 
Prosenjit Poddar was born into the Harijan ("untouchable") caste in 
Bengal, India.33 In September 1967, he came to the University of 
California at Berkeley as a graduate student. In the fall of 1968, Poddar 
met Tatiana Tarasoff while attending folk dancing classes. They saw 
each other weekly throughout the fall, and on New Year's Eve, Tatiana34 
kissed Poddar. Poddar interpreted the kiss as signifying that the two had 
a serious relationship, though this was not what Tatiana had meant to 
imply. When she learned of Poddar's belief, Tatiana told him that she 
was involved with other men and otherwise indicated that she did not 
want to have an intimate relationship with him.35 
The rebuff led Poddar to undergo a severe emotional crisis, in which 
he had periods of depression and neglected his appearance, meals, 
studies, and health. During occasional contacts with Tatiana, Poddar 
audiotaped some of their conversations, trying to figure out why she did 
not love him. He told others about his being in love with Tatiana and his 
thoughts about killing her, saying that he could not control himself.36 
32. For more detailed accounts, see Glenn S. Lipson & Mark 1. Mills, Stalking, Erotomania, and 
the Tarasoff Cases, in 1. REID MELOY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF STALKING: CLINICAL AND FORENSIC 
PERSPECTIVES 259-73 (Meloy ed., 1998); Robert F. Schopp & Michael R. Quattrocchi, Tarasoff. the 
Doctrine of Special Relationships, and the Psychotherapist's Duty to Warn, 121. PSYCHIATRY & L. 13 
(1984); and LEON VANDECREEK & SAMUEL KNAPP, TARASOFF AND BEYOND: LEGAL AND CLINICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE TREATMENT OF LIFE-ENDANGERING PATIENTS 2-7 (2001). 
33. People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 344 (Cal. 1974) [hereinafter Poddar f1]. Poddar's cultural 
background may be relevant to his psychological responses (discussed in the following paragraphs). At 
Poddar's trial, defense counsel had wanted to present expert testimony of an anthropologist concerning 
the cultural stresses that would have affected Poddar's adjustment "from the simple culture in which he 
had lived ... to the sophisticated milieu of an American university." The trial court ruled that the 
anthropologist could testify about cross-cultural difficulties, but that only the psychiatric experts could 
answer hypothetical questions related to Poddar's diminished capacity. The trial court's decision was 
sustained on appeal. People v. Poddar, 103 Cal. Rptr. 84,88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) [hereinafter Poddar 
1]. See also Leslie Bender, Teaching Tort Stories, 55 1. LEGAL EDUC. 108, 113 (2005) (discussing 
potential significance of Poddar' s background and other cultural issues). 
34. At several places in this article, I refer to Poddar's victim as "Tatiana." Use of her first name 
implies no disrespect toward Ms. Tarasoff. Rather, I am trying to make it easy for the reader to 
distinguish references to Poddar's victim from references to her parents or the legal cases that bear her 
last name. 
35. Poddar I/, 518 P.2d at 344. 
36. Poddar f, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 86. 
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Over the next several months, as his mental condition deteriorated, 
Poddar became socially isolated, spoke disjointedly, and often cried.37 
In the summer of 1969, while Tatiana was traveling in South 
America, Poddar began to improve psychologically. At the suggestion 
of a friend, he sought outpatient treatment through the university's 
mental health service38 and became the voluntary outpatient of a 
psychologist employed by Cowell Memorial Hospital at the university.39 
In August 1969, Poddar told the psychologist of his intent to kill 
someone (readily identifiable as Tatiana) when she returned from Brazil. 
The psychologist and two psychiatrist colleagues agreed that Poddar 
should be committed for observation in a mental hospital. The 
psychologist notified the campus police orally and by letter. Three 
police officers took Poddar into custody, but, satisfied that Poddar was 
rational, released him on his promise to stay away from Tatiana. Dr. 
Powelson, the psychiatrist who directed Cowell Memorial Hospital's 
department of psychiatry, then asked the police to return the 
psychologist's letter and ordered that no further action be taken to 
hospitalize Poddar.40 
Poddar stopped seeing his psychologist after the police detained 
him.41 He continued to follow42 Tatiana, however, and at one point 
overheard her talking about a relationship with another man.43 On 
October 27, 1969, Poddar went to Tatiana's home to speak with her. 
Tatiana was not there, and her mother told Poddar to leave. He returned 
later that day, however, armed with a pellet gun and a kitchen knife, and 
found Tatiana alone. When she refused to speak with him and ran from 
the house, Poddar caught up with her and stabbed her to death. He then 
returned to the Tarasoffs' home and called the police.44 
37. Poddar Jl, 518 P.2d at 344. 
38. Id. 
39. TarasofJ /I, 551 P .2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976). 
40. Id.; TarasofJI, 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974). 
41. TarasofJ I, 529 P.2d at 559. 
42. Several clinicians regard Poddar's behavior as what the Anglophone world now calls 
"stalking." See, e.g., Robert Lloyd-Goldstein, De Clerambault On-Line: A Survey of Erotomania and 
Stalking from the Old World to the World Wide Web, in MELOY, supra note 32, at 198; Louis B. 
Schlesinger, Stalking, Homicide, and Catathymic Process: A Case Study, 46 INT'L J. OFFENDER 
THERAPY & COMPo CRIMINOLOGY 64, 69 (2002) (citing the TarasofJ case as an example of homicide 
following stalking). Concerning the social context that led to the emergence of stalking as a distinct 
criminal offense and a recognized pattern of behavior, see Paul E. Mullen et aI., Stalking: New 
Constructions of Human Behaviour, 35 AUSTL. N. Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 9 (2001). 
43. Poddar 1,103 Cal. Rptr. 84,86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 972). 
44. Poddar /I, 518 P.2d 342, 345 (Cal. 1974). 
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At his criminal trial, Poddar offered a diminished capacity defense, 
arguing (through testimony by three psychiatrists and one psychologist) 
that his paranoid schizophrenia precluded his harboring malice 
aforethought at the time of the killing. In rebuttal, a court-appointed 
psychiatrist testified that Poddar was merely schizoid and could harbor 
the mental states requisite for first- or second-degree murder.45 
A jury found Poddar criminally responsible and guilty of second-
degree murder. Poddar filed appeals in which he argued that the trial 
court erred in giving implied malice and second-degree murder 
instructions. Following a decision in which a lower court held that the 
trial court had erred in its jury instructions relating to the effect on any 
implied malice of Pod dar's possible diminished capacity (implied malice 
being an element of second-degree murder),46 the California Supreme 
Court reversed Poddar's conviction and ruled that he should be retried.47 
Rather than prosecute Poddar again, however, the state of California 
released him on condition that he go back to India and not return to the 
United States.48 
Tatiana's parents did not just mourn the loss of their daughter. They 
sued Poddar's therapist, associates, and their employing institution, 
alleging (inter alia) therapist negligence for failure to detain Poddar and 
failure to warn the Tarasoffs of the grave danger to Tatiana that Poddar 
represented.49 They also sought punitive damages for Dr. Powelson's 
behavior following the therapists' attempt to have Poddar hospitalized, 
alleging that his actions constituted "malicious and oppressive 
abandonment of a dangerous patient. ,,50 
The Alameda County trial court dismissed the Tarasoffs' suit. An 
appeals court also ruled against the Tarasoffs, holding that (a) their case 
could not proceed because an action for failure to detain was statutorily 
barred, and (b) the lack of a special relationship between the clinicians 
and either Tatiana or her parents precluded any duty to warn them.51 
The Tarasoffs then appealed to the California Supreme Court. 
45. Id. 
46. Poddar I, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 93. 
47. Poddar II, 518 P.2d at 350. 
48. Fillmore Buckner & Marvin Firestone, "Where the Public Peril Begins ": 25 Years after 
Tarasoff,21 J.LEGALMED.187, 195(2000). 
49. Taraso.fJ II, 551 P.2d 334, 431 (Cal. 1976). 
50. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 108 Cal. Rptr. 878,881 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). 
51. Id. at 880--87. 
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B. The Facts: A Summary 
For the Tarasoffs' lawsuit to proceed and liability to be imposed, the 
California Supreme Court would need to declare a rule under which, 
given the events that preceded Tatiana's death, the behavior of Poddar's 
psychologist and his psychiatrist associates would be negligent. As we 
have just seen, published case law reports that the following events gave 
rise to the Tarasoffs' lawsuit: 
• In August 1969, Poddar told his treating psychologist that he was 
thinking about killing someone, and the psychologist could readily 
identify this person as Tatiana. 
• Shortly after hearing this, the psychologist, with the concurrence of 
two psychiatrist colleagues, notified campus police and asked them 
to pick up Poddar so that he could be hospitalized. 
• The police detained and spoke to Poddar, decided that he was 
rational, and released him after telling him to stay away from 
Tatiana. 
• Dr. Powelson, the psychiatric director at the hospital where Poddar 
received outpatient treatment, ordered that no further action be 
taken to hospitalize Poddar. 
• Poddar stopped treatment and apparently had no further contact 
with his therapist. 
• On October 27, 1969, Poddar came to Tatiana's home, and her 
mother told him to go away. 
• Later that same day, Poddar returned and killed Tatiana. 
Let us assume that a majority of the California Supreme Court judges, 
viewing the allegations of the Tarasoffs, reacted by concluding that if 
those allegations were true, then Poddar's clinicians should have to 
answer to the plaintiffs. The majority's task would then consist of 
having to fashion a legal rule,52 in the form of a major premise, under 
52. I take the position here that in thinking about complex moral and legal issues, judges follow 
the same psychological process that everyone else does: they come to a conclusion, then fill in a 
rationale. Here's one law professor's summary of the process: 
Almost all justices vote almost all of the time in accordancewith their own personal, 
political and religious views .... 
Though presidents, senators and judicial nominees loudly proclaim that justices 
should merely apply "the law" in a neutral manner, every experienced lawyer 
understands that the best predictors of a justice's actual votes are his or her personal, 
political and religious predilections. Any lawyer who ignores this reality is doomed to 
failure .... That is why good lawyers check the biographical material about judges even 
before they read their cases. 
Alan Dershowitz, What Kind of Justice Will Alito Be? (Jan. 13, 2006) FORBES. COM 
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which the behavior of the clinicians and other events that led to the 
Tarasofflawsuit would make the treating clinicians liable. To create this 
major premise, the majority would have to fill in the variables in the 
following conditional statement: 
• If a patient does A, and the therapist does not do B, and the patient 
later harms C, then the therapist will be liable for the harm to C. 
The minor premise, in the Tarasoff case, would be ... 
• Poddar (the patient) did A, his psychologist (the therapist) did not 
do B, and Poddar then harmed C (Tatiana) . 
... from which it follows, modus ponens, that 
• the therapist (Poddar's psychologist) IS liable for the harm to C 
(Tatiana). 
C. The Tarasoff Rule 
1. Overcoming Obstacles 
In formulating a rule under which Poddar's clinicians might be liable, 
the majority first had to address three objections raised by the defendant 
clinicians: (a) the lack of a treatment relationship between the clinicians 
and Tatiana, (b) the difficulty of predicting violence, and (c) the fact that 
warning her would have required the clinicians to breach therapeutic 
confidentiality . 
a. Lack of Treatment Relationship 
Notwithstanding the absence of a treatment relationship involving 
Tatiana, the treatment relationship between Poddar and the defendant 
clinicians, said the majority, "may support affirmative duties for the 
benefit of third persons. ,,53 The majority cited a California case that 
gave physicians duties to control the danger of hospitalized patients 54 
and a Washington state case requiring doctors to warn patients 
http://www.forbes.com!columnistsI2006/0 1/121 alito-confinnation-dershowi tz-comment-
cx_ad_OI13alito.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2006). See also Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political 
Court, 119 HARV. L. REv. 31, 34 (2005) ("the impressions that I have gleaned from being a federal 
appellate judge for the last twenty-four years" lead to the conclusion "that, viewed realistically, the 
Supreme Court, at least most of the time, when it is deciding constitutional cases is a political organ"). 
53. TarasofJlI, 551 P.2d at 343. 
54. Id, (citing Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp., 432 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1967». 
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themselves about conditions or medications that might result in danger 
to others.55 The majority also cited decades-old decisions from other 
jurisdictions that gave physicians duties to warn potential contacts (e.g., 
family members) about a patient's contagious disease. 56 
h. Difficulty of Predicting Violence 
Interestingly, the Tarasoffmajority made two seemingly contradictory 
arguments to deal with and dismiss problems with anticipating future 
violence. On the one hand, the court "recognize[ d] the difficulty that a 
therapist encounters in attempting to forecast whether a patient presents 
a serious danger of violence.,,57 The court felt that to resolve this, it 
needed only to apply the traditional negligence standard to the problem 
of violence prediction. This would require a mental health professional 
to "forecast a serious danger" only with 
'that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed 
and exercised by members of [that professional specialty] under similar 
circumstances.' ... [T]he therapist is free to exercise his or her own best 
judgment without liability; proof, aided by hindsi~ht, that he or she 
judged wrongly is insufficient to establish negligence. 8 
On the other hand, the court said that it was not necessary to base its 
ruling on any assumed accuracy of predictions. "In the instant case," the 
majority said, 
55. TarasofJ II, 551 P.2d at 344 (citing Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14 (Wash. 
1965). 
56. TarasofJII, 551 P.2d at 344 (citing Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1959); Davis v. Rodman 227 S.w. 612 (Ark. 1921); Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663 
(Minn. 1919); Jones v. Stanko, 160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928)). 
57. TarasofJ II, 551 P.2d at 345. Among the publications the Court cited in acknowledging the 
problem of prediction was a work of Professor Monahan's. See TarasofJ II, 551 P. 2d at 344, citing 
Monahan, The Prevention of Violence, in COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (Monahan ed., 1975). 
58. TarasofJII, 551 P. 2d at 345 (citations omitted). The Court apparently did not recognize how 
high a standard it actually set. Viewed "in hindsight," i.e., after a patient had harmed someone, any 
judgment by a therapist that the patient did not pose a "serious danger" might easily appear-to 
opposing counsel, opposing experts, and the factfinder-to have fallen short of the therapist's "best 
judgment." 
In other words, the court seems unaware of the impact of hindsight bias, a well-documented 
tendency for individuals who know an outcome to exaggerate the ease with which the outcome was 
predictable in advance, or to exaggerate the advance likelihood of an event once it has already occurred. 
The classic articles include Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ;t Foresight: The EfJect of Outcome Knowledge 
on Judgement under Uncertainty, I J. EXPER. PSYCHOL. HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 
(I975), and Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgements of Past Events after the 
Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311 (1990). 
HeinOnline -- 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 538 2006-2007
538 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
the pleadings do not raise any question as to failure of defendant 
therapists to predict that Poddar presented a serious danger of violence. 
On the contrary, the present complaints allege that defendant therapists 
did in fact predict that Poddar would kill, but were negligent in failing to 
59 . warn. 
The Tarasoff majority even takes the position that concern about 
prediction accuracy may be absurd. Imagine that a patient talks to his 
therapist about his plans for a political killing. "We would hesitate to 
hold that the therapist who is aware that his patient expects to attempt to 
assassinate the President of the United States would not be obligated to 
warn the authorities because the therapist cannot predict with accuracy 
that his patient will commit the crime.,,60 
c. Confidentiality 
The Tarasoff majority addressed the problem of confidentiality 
through a cost-benefit analysis. While recognizing the public health 
benefits of having psychotherapeutic treatment occur in contexts with 
assurances of privacy, the court thought the cost to the patient of 
sacrificing privacy was merely "conjectural," while the "peril to the 
victim's life" was not.61 Accordingly, society's safety outweighs 
therapeutic confidentiality. Despite the existence of a "public policy 
favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-
psychotherapist communications," this protection "must yield to the 
extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others.,,62 
59. TarasofJII, 551 P. 2d at 345. 
This statement deserves two comments. First, one might maintain that the Court's positions are not 
contradictory by saying that adherence to professional standards is the issue, not accuracy. In other 
words, suppose that mental health professionals made predictions by reading palms, viewing tea leaves, 
and divining the future from entrails. For purposes of assigning liability, all that would matter is 
whether the defendant-therapist followed his profession's customary procedures for reading palms, 
viewing tea leaves, or examining entrails; the fact that these forecasting methods are useless would be 
irrelevant. 
Second, notice that the TarasofJmajority states that Poddar's therapist and his colleagues "did in fact 
predict that Poddar would kill .... " Id. (emphasis added). One could argue, however, that the 
clinicians did no such thing-they responded to Poddar's uttered statements. As Section VII 
emphasizes infra, predicting violence and responding to a verbalized threat are two very different 
actions. 
60. TarasofJ II, 551 P.2d at 346. Notice, again, that the majority has characterized a therapist's 
being "aware" that "his patient expects to attempt to assassinate the President" as a prediction, when in 
fact what most likely would have occurred was that the therapist heard the patient describe his plans. 
Id. Clearly, however, hearing a patient make a threat is an activity that differs crucially from making a 
prediction of the patient's behavior. 
61. ld. at 346. 
62. ld. at 347. 
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2. The Major Premise 
Recall that, under the assumption that a majority of the California 
Supreme Court wished to substantiate its perception that Poddar's 
clinicians had a responsibility to respond to his statements about future 
violence, the court needed to formulate a major premise from which the 
facts in Tarasoff could be grounds for finding the clinicians liable. The 
general form of this major premise was, "If a patient does A and the 
therapist does not do B and the patient later harms C, the therapist will 
be liable for the harm to C." Under the Tarasoffmajority's ruling, A, B, 
and C take on these meanings: 
• A =displays behavior that a therapist should recognize as indicating 
that the patient presents a serious danger of violence 
• B =( 1) apply the standards of the therapist's profession to determine 
that the patient presents a serious danger of violence, and then (2) 
use reasonable care to protect an intended victim63 from the danger 
• C =the victim 
The minor premise then becomes 
• Poddar (the patient) made a threat, that is, displayed behavior that a 
therapist should have recognized as indicating that Poddar 
presented a serious risk of violence, and his psychologist (the 
therapist) did not both (1) apply the standards of his profession to 
determine that Poddar presented a serious danger of violence and 
then (2) use reasonable care to protect an intended victim from the 
danger, and Poddar later harmed Tatiana (the victim). 
The conclusion must be 
• The therapist (Poddar's psychologist) is liable for the harm to 
Tatiana (the victim). 
Here is how the Tarasoff majority expressed the major premIse 
equivalently, if more succinctly: 
63. The phrase "intended victim" has some ambiguity. The TarasoJJ court probably meant to 
point to the specific individual(s) whom the patient intended to harm and whom a therapist could readily 
identify as an intended victim. This interpretation is supported by subsequent California decisions that 
limited the scope of a therapist's duty to readily identifiable victims. See Thompson v. County of 
Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 734 (Cal. 1980) (declining to impose "blanket liability" for harm to any 
conceivable victim); Mavroudis v. Superior Court, \02 Cal. App. 3d 594, 600-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) 
(duty triggered only when patient poses "an imminent threat of serious danger to a readily identifiable 
victim"). As we shall see, however, later decisions relying on TarasoJJ effectively interpreted this 
phrase as designating those individuals who were harmed as a result of a patient's intentional, harm-
inducing actions, whether or not a therapist could have identified them in advance. 
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When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his 
profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of 
violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to 
protect the intended victim against such danger. 64 
This formulation leaves open the question, "What does it mean to 'use 
reasonable care to protect the intended victim'? Were not the actions 
that Poddar's clinicians' took-which included asking the police to 
assist with involuntary hospitalization two months before the 
homicide-'reasonable care'? What more could you ask of them?" The 
court gave an open-ended answer: it "depend[ s] upon the nature of the 
case. ,,65 The therapist might have "to warn the intended victim or others 
likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take 
whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the 
circumstances.,,66 Thus, "under the circumstances" faced by Poddar's 
clinicians, mere efforts to hospitalize Poddar might not have sufficed, 
and they could be liable for Tatiana's death. 
III. WHAT TARASOFF IMPLIES 
Two key assumptions lie behind the Tarasoff majority's ruling. 
These assumptions involve implicit beliefs about (1) the nature of policy 
judgments and (2) relationships between certain kinds of clinical facts 
and clinicians' knowledge of those facts. 
A. Balancing of Confidentiality Against Public Safety 
The majority's conclusion that "the public policy favoring protection 
of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications 
must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger 
to others" suggests that it is possible to decide, through a utilitarian 
calculus, whether the benefits of assuring therapeutic confidentiality are 
worth more or less than having therapists serve as a line of defense 
against violence. As Section I of this Article67 notes, Tarasoff declares 
the therapist-patient relationship an exception to the general rule that 
individuals have no duty to control the conduct of other persons. The 
decision employs a balancing test that considers several factors, 
including "'the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the 
64. Tarasoff 11,55 I P.2d at 340. 
65. !d. 
66. Id. 
67. See supra note 2 I and accompanying text. 
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burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of 
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and 
the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk 
involved. ",68 
In making the case for an exception to the presumption of 
nonresponsibility for the acts of others, Tarasoff II cites a series of cases 
that involved mental patients who acted violently.69 Thus, one factor 
that seems to have tipped the scale in favor of a "policy decision" 
making therapists liable was the unique type of risk posed by mental 
patients. As the following paragraph suggests, that risk, if avoidable, 
was one the court found unacceptable: 
Our current crowded and computerized society compels the 
interdependence of its members. In this risk-infested society we can 
hardly tolerate the further exposure to danger that would result from a 
concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was lethal. If the 
exercise of reasonable care to protect the threatened victim requires the 
therapist to warn the endangered party or those who can reasonably be 
expected to notify him, we see no sufficient societal interest that would 
protect and justify concealment. The containment of such risks lies in the 
public interest. 70 
In his dissent, Justice Clark concluded that the majority had clearly 
gotten this calculation wrong. "Overwhelming policy considerations" 
he wrote, "weigh against" the duty imposed by the majority.71 Without 
an assurance of confidentiality, those needing treatment might not seek 
it because of the stigma attached to getting mental health care, and 
treatment would be less effective for those who did get it.72 Further, an 
absence of confidentiality would lead to an absence of trust in one's 
therapist, "the very means by which treatment is effected.,,73 Rather 
than reduce violence, Justice Clark concluded, "the duty to warn 
imposed by the majority will cripple the use and effectiveness of 
psychiatry. Many people, potentially violent-yet susceptible to 
68. Tarasojf 11,551 P.2d at 342 (quoting Merrill v. Buck, 375 P.2d 304 (Cal. 1962); Biakanja v. 
Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958); Walnut Creek Aggregates Co. v. Testing Eng'rs Inc., 56 Cal. Rptr. 700 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1967)). 
69. See Tarasojfll, 551 P.2d at 344 (citing Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp., 
432 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1967); Semler v. Psychiatric Inst. of D.C., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976); Underwood 
v. U.S., 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966); Fair v. U.S., 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956); Greenberg v. Barbour, 
322 F.Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1971); and Merchs. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. U.S., 272 F.Supp. 
409 (D.N.D. I 967)). 
70. Tarasojfll, 551 P.2d at 347. 
71. Tarasojfll, 551 P.2d at 358 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
72. Id. at 359. 
73. Id. 
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treatment-will be deterred from seeking it.,,74 
Subsequent scholarship has suggested that, as an empirical matter, 
both the dissent and the majority were mistaken. Eight years after 
predicting, in 1976/5 that the Tarasoff decisions would gravely impede 
therapists' treatment efforts, psychiatrist Alan Stone recognized that "the 
duty to warn is not as unmitigated a disaster for the enterprise of 
psychotherapy as it once seemed to critics like myself.,,76 Although the 
ambiguous duties imposed by Tarasoff caused anxiety among mental 
health professionals, therapists nonetheless adjusted to what they 
perceived as the law's new expectations. The study that has done the 
best job of examining the impact of implementing Tarasoff suggested 
that when therapists had issued warnings, "in most cases issuing the 
warning had a minimal or a positive effect on the psychotherapeutic 
relationship.,,77 In another study, the same researchers found "that 
almost half of the targets of patients' threats were family members, 
spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends," a finding that they thought 
supported the view "that the Tarasoff type of situation," rather than 
being detrimental for treatment, "may hold promise for family-oriented 
therapeutic interventions.,,78 
But if warnings have not undermined psychotherapy, they may also 
not accomplish the public protection goal that motivated the majority's 
holding in Tarasoff. Psychiatrist Thomas G. Gutheil suggests that often, 
courses of action that require therapists to breach confidentiality can be 
expected to have worse outcomes than courses of action that preserved 
confidentiality. Dr. Gutheil demonstrates this by reviewing the original 
facts of Tarasofffrom the vantage point of a "modem clinician." That 
is, Dr. Gutheil assumes that a "hypothetical earlier case" had already 
established a Tarasoff-like duty to protect, and then looks at how 
effective-as public protection measures-various options for protective 
intervention might have been in averting the danger posed by Poddar. 
Trying to commit Poddar to a hospital would not have protected Tatiana; 
even if treaters had known Poddar would attack her in October 1969, her 
74. Id. at 360. 
75. Alan Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. 
L. REv. 358 (1976). 
76. STONE, supra note 13, at 181. 
77. Renee Binder & Dale McNiel, Application of the Tarasoff Ruling and Its Effect on the Victim 
and the Therapeutic Relationship, 47 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1212, 1212 (1996) (following California's 
enactment of a statute prescribing specific conditions for dealing with threatened violence, almost half 
of psychiatry residents had issued Tarasoff-type warnings). 
78. Dale McNiel et aI., Management of Threats of Violence Under California's Duty to Protect 
Statute, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1097, 1100 (1998). 
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absence from the country when Poddar uttered his threat meant that no 
danger was imminent, and no court would have authorized his 
involuntary hospitalization. Because Tatiana was out of the country, 
warning her directly would have been "difficult to impossible." 
Warnings to Tatiana's family members would have been of questionable 
value because whether and when family members would convey this 
information "might be difficult to predict.,,79 
Although Poddar may have left "treatment precisely because of the 
breach of confidentiality," Gutheil believes that Poddar's therapist could 
instead have maintained confidentiality, trying "to keep him in treatment 
aimed at decreasing his shame, rage, and dangerousness." If Poddar had 
still felt intense rage toward Tatiana after she returned, his treating 
psychologist might have encouraged and helped Poddar to notify her 
himself, which would have obviated any reason for the therapist to 
breach therapeutic confidentiality. Gutheil's point is that one cannot 
generalize about the costs and benefits of warnings or other protective 
measures; without analyzing the facts of a particular case, one cannot 
conclude what course of action best addresses the concerns of the 
patient, the therapist, and the larger public.80 
The difficulty of deciding whether a policy of preserving therapeutic 
confidentiality provides more value than a policy that mandates 
warnings or other actions based on probabilistic judgments is a matter to 
which this Article will return shortly.81 For now, it suffices to notice 
that the reasoning in Tarasoff assumes that weighing and balancing of 
benefits is possible and that such a process can guide legal policy-
making. 
B. Implicit Model of Patients and of Therapists ' Knowledge 
Both the 1974 and 1976 Tarasoff decisions contain the sentence, 
state: "The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins. ,,82 
This occurrence prompts Buckner and Firestone to observe, "[t]he court 
obviously liked the ring of this phrase.,,83 Besides being a pithy, 
alliterative summation of the court's views on confidentiality versus 
preventing violence, the sentence also suggests that one could, in theory, 
establish a clear demarcation between those clinical situations in which 
79. Guthei1, supra note 2, at 353. 
80. Id. 
81. See discussion infra, Part V (describing broad disagreements in individuals' perceptions of 
the desirability of various outcomes). 
82. TarasojJl, 529 P.2d 553, 561 (Cal. 1974), TarasojJll, 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976). 
83. Buckner & Firestone, supra note 48, at 198. 
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patients pose "a serious danger of violence" that constitutes a "public 
peril," and those situations in which patients pose no such danger. "[A] 
therapist should not be encouraged routinely to reveal such threats," says 
the court. "To the contrary, the therapist's obligations to his patient 
require that he not disclose a confidence unless such disclosure is 
necessary to avert danger to others."s4 
This point about the implications of the Tarasoff court's thinking 
deserves more precise delineation. In referring at one point to the 
"concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was lethal,,,s5 
Tarasoff implies that patients either are "lethal" or they are not. 
Presumably, because the Tarasoff rule refers to "a serious danger of 
violence," the court's implication extends to forms of violence that are 
not lethal, but that result in significant injury. Some reflection suggests 
that this makes intuitive sense: because death either occurs or it does 
not, one can logically dichotomize people who become victims of 
patient violence as those who die and those who do not. Given a clear 
definition of "serious injury,,,S6 one could also divide victims into those 
who were injured seriously and those who were not. Similarly, 
reflection suggests that one could logically dichotomize therapists' 
choices about patients: faced with a particular clinical situation, a 
therapist can either to take some form of protective action, or not do so. 
Tarasoff carries this dichotomization beyond the realm of facts about 
the world-a patient either does or does not commit violence, a therapist 
either takes or does not take protective action-to the realm of 
therapists' knowledge about those facts. Tarasoffassumes that, because 
death or serious violence are either/or phenomena and because taking 
action is something a therapist either does or does not do, a therapist 
therefore either has knowledge about future violence or does not. By 
virtue of such knowledge, a therapist can either realize that a duty to 
warn or take other protective action has arisen, or can fail to realize this. 
84. TarasofJ fI, 551 P.2d at 347. 
85. Id. 
86. In any study of violence prediction, researchers must decide what actions "count" as violent 
events so that they can decide whether a particular person should be regarded as having acted violently. 
A moment's reflection will reveal that individuals' actions come in degrees of violence, from more 
minor (and questionably violent) incidents such as pushing and shoving, to major (and unquestionably 
violent) incidents such as lethal assaults with firearms. I discuss this problem further in Douglas 
Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate about Accuracy, 62 1. CONSULTING 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 783, 784 (1994) [hereinafter Mossman, Accuracy). An example of how violence is 
defined for purposes of such a study appears in Henry 1. Steadman et aI., Violence by People Discharged 
From Acute Psychiatric Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 393, 395 (1998) (violence defined as battery that results in physical injury, sexual 
assaults, assaultive acts with weapons, or threats made while holding a weapon). 
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As framed by the TarasofJ decision, the duty to protect takes this form: 
• there are naturally only two types of patients-those who will do 
violence and those who will not; 
• therapists therefore must categorize patients into those about whom 
action to protect a third party is warranted, and those about whom 
no such action is warranted; 
• therapists then should take the action that their categorization 
dictates. 
True, TarasofJ does not explicitly require therapists to get every 
judgment right, but only to use their "best" judgment and to exercise 
reasonable care in their employment of professional standards when 
making these judgments. The point, however, is that therapists' 
judgments are assumed to take the form of binary, "yes-or-no" 
assessments about whether "a serious danger of violence" exists. More 
succinctly: because violence either will occur or will not, and because a 
therapist can either take a protective action or not, therapists' judgments 
about violence are assumed to take the form of predictions that violence 
either will or will not occurY 
C. Subsequent Cases 
As troublesome as TarasofJ was, its legal progeny were even more 
unsettling for therapists. Thorough review of these cases would take us 
far beyond the scope of this article. The cases described in the following 
paragraphs illustrate (1) how other courts have perceived clinical 
violence assessments as binary predictions and (2) the expansion of 
mental health professionals' prediction duties beyond situations in which 
patients make threats to harm specific persons to include all 
"foreseeable" victims harmed by intentional actions-an expansion that 
flows logically from the liability-defining major premise created by the 
TarasofJ court. 
87. Quattrocchi and Schopp believe that viewing violence assessments as binary arises from 
Tarasofj's origins in negligence law, where foreseeability is central to the existence of a duty. They 
believe that, in the case of possible future violence, prediction foreseeability "generates protective 
obligations that reflect dichotomous classification of persons. Those classified as not dangerous trigger 
no protective obligation on the part of the clinician and those classified as dangerous trigger a protective 
obligation." Michael R. Quattrocchi & Robert F. Schopp, Tarasaurus Rex: A Standard of Care That 
Could Not Adapt, I I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. \09, 177 (2005). 
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1. Lipari v. Sears 
The first major case articulating the expanding duty to protect was 
Lipari v. Sears Roebuck & Company. 88 Ulysses Cribbs had been 
committed to a psychiatric hospital and had received psychiatric care 
from the Veterans Administration (the VA). He purchased a shotgun 
from Sears while he was undergoing a month-long episode of day 
treatment89 at the VA. A month after Cribbs stopped the treatment, he 
walked into a nightclub, shot Dennis Lipari to death, and seriously 
wounded Lipari's wife, Ruth Ann. Mrs. Lipari sued Sears, alleging 
negligent sale of a shotgun to a mentally ill person; Sears and Mrs. 
Lipari sued the VA on the basis of negligent failure to detain the patient 
who should have been recognized to be dangerous. As in Tarasoff, the 
alleged tort involved failure to take adequate action to protect a third 
party. 
The VA's motion for dismissal was denied by District Court, because, 
under its reading of Nebraska law and § 315 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, 
the relationship between a psychotherapist and his patient gives rise to an 
affirmative duty for the benefit of third persons. This duty requires that 
the therapist initiate whatever precautions are reasonably necessary to 
protect potential victims of his patient. This duty arises only when, in 
accordance with the standards of his profession, the therapist knows or 
should know that his patient's dangerous propensities present an 
unreasonable risk of harm to others.9o 
Unlike the psychologist who treated Tatiana Tarasoffs killer, Cribbs's 
care-givers had never heard their patient threaten the Liparis or anyone 
else. But as was the case in the Tarasoff ruling, the liability trigger in 
Lipari was not a threat or other action of the patient. Instead, Lipari 
followed Tarasoff in implicitly requiring the therapist to take action 
following a judgment about the patient's future behavior, a judgment 
embodied in a yes-or-no prediction concerning whether a patient 
represents "an unreasonable risk of harm." 
88. 497 F.Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980). 
89. Day treatment "[is] a fonn of partial hospitalization [that] can be helpful for patients who do 
not require inpatient care but who may benefit from more intensive care than is possible for outpatients." 
John S. Ogrodniczuk & Paul I. Steinberg, A Renewed Interest in Day Treatment, 50 CAN. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 77, 77 (2005). 
90. Lipari, 497 F.Supp. at 193. 
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2. Jablonski v. u.s. 
The ability to distinguish violent from nonviolent patients is an 
important implicit premise underlying Jablonski v. United States.91 On 
July 7, 1978, Phillip Jablonski threatened and attempted to rape Isobel 
Pahls, the mother of Melinda Kimball, with whom Jablonski had been 
living. Three days later, Jablonski agreed to undergo an outpatient 
psychiatric evaluation at the Lorna Linda (California) V A Hospital, and 
Kimball went with him. Pahls had called local police, who in tum had 
called the VA about Jablonski's prior criminal record, but no one 
relayed this information to the psychiatrist who evaluated Jablonski. 
During the evaluation, Jablonski acknowledged receiving prior 
psychiatric treatment, but the evaluating psychiatrist did not obtain 
records of Jablonski's treatment at other VA facilities in California and 
other states. Records from Jablonski's treatment ten years earlier in EI 
Paso, Texas would have shown that at that time, Jablonski had 
homicidal thoughts about his wife and had "on numerous 
occasions ... tried to kill her.,,92 
The Lorna Linda psychiatrist offered Jablonski voluntary admission, 
which Jablonski refused; the psychiatrist concluded there were no 
grounds for involuntary hospitalization. The psychiatrist recommended 
that Kimball stay away from Jablonski, but she would not do so despite 
telling the psychiatrist she felt unsafe with him. Two psychiatrists met 
with Jablonski again a few days later and again concluded that he did 
not meet criteria for involuntary hospitalization. While Jablonski was 
being evaluated, a third V A psychiatrist again recommended that 
Kimball stay away from Jablonski. Kimball did not, however, and two 
days later, Jablonski murdered her.93 
Kimball's daughter sued the V A for malpractice, and the district court 
found liability by the hospital psychiatrists for failing to record and 
transmit the information from the police, failing to obtain Jablonski's 
past psychiatric records, and failing to adequately warn Kimball; each 
failure, ruled the district court, was a proximate cause of Kimball's 
death.94 The U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the district court's ruling, 
finding that the Tarasoff decision was "on point.,,95 Though Jablonski 
had not threatened Kimball, his "previous history," said the appeals 
91. 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983). 
92. Jablonski, 712 F.2d at 393. 
93. Id. at 394. Phillip Jablonski's history of violence, before and after this killing, is described in 
People v. Jablonski, 126 P.3d 938, 944-52 (Cal. 2006). 
94. Jablonski, 712 F.2d at 394. 
95. Id. at 398. 
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court, "indicated that he would likely direct his violence against 
Kimball." His past acts of violence against his former wife and "[h]is 
psychological profile indicated that his violence was likely to be directed 
against women very close to him. This, in tum, was borne out by his 
attack on Pahls.,,96 
Psychiatrists have interpreted Jablonski as a lesson telling them that 
seeking adequate information, especially readily available past records, 
is crucial to avoiding malpractice liability.97 But the case also assumes 
that given adequate information, there can be a crystal-clear distinction 
between those patients who do and do not have "psychological profiles" 
portending particular types of violence. 
3. Petersen v. State 
Tarasoff, Lipari, and Jablonski all had stemmed from intentional acts 
by current or former psychiatric patients. But because these cases had 
been framed in terms of foreseeable harm created by patients, it was a 
natural extension to make clinicians liable for reckless acts as well. 
Petersen v. State98 was the first case to do this. 
On May 14, 1977, Cynthia Petersen was injured in an automobile 
accident caused by Larry Knox, who was speeding, ran a red light, and 
appeared to be under the influence of drugs. Five days earlier, Knox had 
been released from Western State Hospital, where he had undergone a 
two-week involuntary hospitalization for what his doctors ultimately 
diagnosed as a psychotic reaction to "angel dust." His psychiatrist had 
prescribed the antipsychotic drug thiothixene for Knox while he was at 
the hospital. The evening before his discharge, hospital security 
personnel had apprehended Knox while he was driving his car recklessly 
on the hospital grounds. But his psychiatrist discharged him believing 
that he had recovered from the drug reaction, was not psychotic, and had 
returned to his usual type of personality and behavior. After the 
accident, Petersen sued the State alleging that the hospital negligently 
treated Knox by failing to protect her from his dangerous propensities 
by, for example, seeking additional confinement. The jury agreed and 
awarded Petersen $250,000.99 
96. [d. 
97. See, e.g., THOMAS G. GUTHEIL & PAUL s. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, 196 (3rd ed. 2000) (discussing the frequent difficulty of obtaining such 
records and observing, "A discouragingly common element in litigation involves the imputation that the 
clinician failed to obtain significant old records that allegedly would have altered the treatment plan."). 
98. 671 P.2d 230 (Wis. 1983). 
99. It may have helped the plaintiff's case to have introduced, at trial, evidence about the Knox 
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The Washington Supreme Court, citing Tarasoff and Lipari, upheld 
the lower court's verdict by finding that the requisite special 
relationshiploo existed between the hospital and Knox such that they had 
a duty to control Knox. Because of this, the Washington Supreme Court 
concluded that the psychiatrist-patient relationship had indeed created "a 
duty to take reasonable precautions to protect anyone who might 
foreseeably be endangered by Larry Knox's drug-related mental 
problems," and that the psychiatrist's decision to discharge Knox 
without seeking additional involuntary hospitalization was subject to 
civil sanction via a malpractice action. lol Implicit in Petersen is the 
notion that, because the decision to seek commitment or not is binary, 
assessments of whether individuals warrant commitment-that is, 
assessment of whether there is a need to protect "anyone who might 
foreseeably be endangered" by patients-are binary as well. 
IV. OUR MATHEMATICAL UNDERSTANDING OF VIOLENCE PREDICTION 
A. Conceptualizations of the Psychiatric Prediction of Violence: 
The 1970s and 1980s 
The notion that knowledge about future violence should take the form 
of binary predictions was a feature not of just the Tarasoff ruling and its 
progeny, but of much of the social science research about violence 
prediction that existed when Tarasoffwas issued and in the decade that 
followed. Table 1 explains the meaning of several indices of accuracy 
used in describing the accuracy of binary predictions. 
subsequent actions and psychiatric treatment after the automobile accident with Petersen. The jury 
learned that seven months after the accident, Knox killed a couple and raped their daughter. The 
malpractice jury also heard evidence from other psychiatrists who treated Knox after the accident. They 
testified that Knox had schizophrenia, though they disagreed about what type of schizophrenia Knox 
suffered. See Petersen, 671 P.2d at 242-44. 
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965); see also Petersen, 671 P.2d at 237. 
101. Petersen, 671 P.2d at 237. 
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Table 1. -- Chief methods of characterizing the accuracy of binary violence 
predictions. 
Patients' Actual Behavior: 
Predictions: Violent (V+) Not violent (V-) Sums: 
"Will be violent" (T+) E = true positives F = false positives E+F 
"Will not be violent" (T-) G = false negatives H = true negatives G+H 
Sums: E+G F+H 
base rate = BR = probability of violence = P(V+) = A +C 
A +B +C +D 
Note that: 
correct fraction = E + H 
E +F +G +H 
E +H percent correct = xl 00% 
E+F+G+H 
sensitivity = true positive rate (TPR) = P(T+I V+) = _E_ 
E +G 
specificity = true negative rate (TNR) = P(T-I V-) = __ H __ 
F+H 
false positive rate (FPR) = 1 - TNR = P(T+I V-) = _F_ 
F+H 
positive predictive value = PPV= P(V+IT+) = _E_ 
E +F 







E +F +G +H E +F +G +H 




E +G E ) (I E +G ) ( E +G F ) 
E+F+G+HxE+G + -E+F+G+H x E+F+G+HxF+H 
BRxTPR P(V+)P(T·W+) 
(BR x TPR)+([I-BR] x FPR) P(V +)P(T ·loW +) +[1 - P(V +)]P(T ~V-) 
which is a statement of Bayes's Theorem. 
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In Table 1, violence either occurs (V+) or does not (V-), and-by 
analogy with diagnostic tests in medicine-the "test" (that is, a 
prediction about whether violence will occur) for violence is either 
"positive" (T+) or negative (T-). If a clinician predicts that a subject 
will act violently and that subject later does commit violence, that 
prediction is a "true positive." If a clinician predicts that a subject will 
act violently but the subject does not, that prediction is a "false 
positive." Similarly, predictions of nonviolence can tum out to be "true 
negative" or "false negative" predictions. The results of a study of 
violence prediction then are succinctly summarized by knowing four 
values: 
• E = the number of true positives 
• F = the number of false positives 
• G = the number of false negatives 
• H = the number of true negatives 
From E, F, G, and H, one can calculate all the accuracy indices listed 
below the 2x2 contingency matrix in Table 1. To illustrate how 
Tarasojj:era studies evaluated and characterized accuracy, let us review 
data from a study by Kozol and colleagues 102 that Tarasoff cited. 103 
Kozol and colleagues examined outcomes of 592 convicted men sent 
to the Center for the Diagnosis and Treatment for Dangerous Persons in 
Bridgewater, Massachusetts. Clinicians at the center reached initial 
conclusions that 304 of these men were not dangerous. These men were 
therefore released into the community after completing their sentences, 
and twenty-six of them later committed serious crimes. Courts agreed 
with clinicians' diagnoses of dangerousness in 226 cases and committed 
these men to the center for treatment. Following treatment, eighty-two 
patients were discharged on recommendation of the clinical staff, and 
five later committed serious crimes. Courts also released forty-nine 
committed patients against advice of clinicians, and seventeen of these 
men later committed serious crimes. 
102. Harry L. Kozol et aI., The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 
371.390 (1972). 
103. TarasoJJ II. 551 P.2d 334, 360 (Cal. 1976) (Clark, J., dissenting). Kozol and colleagues' 
study was an important data source in Professor Monahan's famous monograph, JOHN MONAHAN, THE 
CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 44, 48 (1981). Their study continues to be cited in legal 
documents. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,323 (1993); SHIRLEY A. DOBBIN & SOPHIA I. 
GATOWSKI, A JUDGE'S DESKBOOK ON THE BASIC PHILOSOPHIES AND METHODS OF SCIENCE 200 
(1999). available at http://www.unr.edulbench; and Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The "Fit" of 
Expert Predictions in Civil Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 1,90 (2003). 
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Table 2. - Data and interpretations of findings, based on Kozol 
colleagues' data.104 
Discharsed Patients' Actual Behavior: 
Recommendations "Serious Crime" = No "Serious Crime" 
(Treated as Predictions): Violent (V+) 
Not violent (V-) 
Do not release = 
17 = true positives 32 = false positives Will be violent (T+) 
Release = 
31 = false negatives 355 = true negatives 
Will not be violent (T-) 
Sums: 48 387 
base rate = BR = probability of violence = P(V +) = 48 = 0.110 
correct fraction = 17 + 355 = 0.855 
435 
percent correct = 85.5% 
435 






specificity = true negative rate (TNR) = P(T -I V-) = 355 = 0.917 
32 +355 
false positive rate (FPR) = P(T+I V-) = 32 = 0.083 
32 +355 
positive predictive value=PPV=P(V+IT+) = 17 =0.347 
17 +32 
negative predictive value = NPV= P(V-IT--) = 355 = 0.920 
31+355 
and 
For purposes of my (and Professor Monahan'sI05) analysis, the 
relevant subjects were the 304+82+49 = 435 patients about whom 
clinicians had made judgments and who had been released to the 
community. Committing a serious crime following release constituted 
being violent. A clinical recommendation for release was treated as a 
prediction of no violence (a "negative" prediction), and a judgment that 
a patient should not be released was a prediction of violence (a 
"positive" prediction). The results allow preparation of Table 2. 
104. See supra note 102. 
105. MONAHAN, supra note 103, at 44, 48. 
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The various calculations in Table 2 pennit several different 
interpretations of the Bridgewater clinicians' accuracy. The traditional 
medical indices of binary test accuracy are sensitivity and specificity. If 
one uses these indices to evaluate the Table 2 data, one concludes that 
the clinicians did not detect most of the violent patients (i.e., their 
sensitivity was only 0.354), but they were very good at detecting 
nonviolent patients (i.e., their specificity is 0.917). However, studies of 
violence prediction in the Tarasoff era often focused on another index-
the positive predictive value (PPV). This index provides the answer to 
the question, "If a clinician predicted that an individual would be 
violent, what is the probability that the clinician was right?" Using the 
data from Kozol and colleagues, one sees that the response is, "About 
one-third of the time," or equivalently, "clinicians' predictions of 
violence were wrong about two-thirds of the time." 
Because of findings and interpretations like these, discussions of 
violence prediction in the 1970s and 1980s reached these conclusions: 
• "[P]sychiatrists have absolutely no expertise in predicting 
dangerous behavior-indeed, they may be less accurate predictors 
than laymen-and ... they usually err by overpredicting 
violence.,,106 
• "[T]he 'best' clinical research currently in existence indicates that 
psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out 
of three predictions of violent behavior over a several-year period 
among institutionalized populations that had both committed 
violence in the past ... and who were diagnosed as mentally i11.,,107 
• "In general, mental health professionals ... are more likely to be 
wrong than right when they predict legally relevant behavior. 
When predicting violence, dangerousness, and suicide, they are far 
more likely to be wrong than right.,,108 
• "The American Psychiatric Association (AP A), participating in this 
case as amicus curiae, infonns us that '[t]he unreliability of 
psychiatric predictions of long-tenn future dangerousness is by now 
an established fact within the profession.' ... The APA's best 
estimate is that two out of three predictions of long-tenn future 
violence made by psychiatrists are wrong .... [T]he APA's Draft 
106. Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping 
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REv. 693, 734-35 (1974). 
107. MONAHAN, supra note 103, at 47-49 (1981). 
108. Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 
51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527,600 (1978). Author's comment: I do not agree with everything Professor Morse 
writes, but after more than a quarter-century, this remains a great article. 
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Report of the Task Force on the Role of Psychiatry in the 
Sentencing Process (1983) ... states that '[ c ]onsiderable evidence 
has been accumulated by now to demonstrate that long-term 
prediction by psychiatrists of future violence is an extremely 
inaccurate process. ",109 
Thus, at the time of the Tarasoff decisions and during the decade 
afterward, available research was taken to imply that mental health 
professionals could not predict violence over long periods of time. 
Moreover, mental health professionals also believed, based on then-
available evidence, that individuals who suffered from mental disorders 
did not commit violence at rates greater than the rates of the general 
population, if one statistically "controlled" for those sociodemographic 
factors (e.g., being young and poor) that were known to increase the risk 
of violence. 110 Thus, if the prevailing beliefs were correct, Tarasoff 
imposed a dual unfairness on psychiatric patients and their therapists. 
The decision stigmatized persons with mental disorders as especially 
dangerous and, if they sought treatment, left them subject to potentially 
embarrassing breaches of confidentiality. As for their therapists, 
Tarasoff insisted that mental health clinicians follow "professional 
standards" for detecting "serious danger" when, in fact, mental health 
professionals seemed to have no ability to do this. 
B. Advances in the 1990s 
1. Statistical Advances 
In a highly influential 1984 article, III Professor Monahan opined that 
the apparently-dismal results from then-available violence prediction 
studies might reflect problems with the definition of violence, imprecise 
follow-up and ascertainment, and lengthy periods of time (usually years) 
covered by the studies. Professor Monahan hoped that a "second 
generation" of violence prediction studies, involving shorter time 
periods, better technology, and better identification and quantifying of 
109. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,920 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
110. John Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 512-13 (1992) (summarizing previous beliefs and giving examples of sources); 
Elizabeth Walsh & Thomas Fahy, Violence in Society, 325 BRIT. MEn. J. 507, 507 (2002) (citing H. 
Hafner & W. Boker, Mentally Disordered Violent Offenders, 8 Soc. PSYCHIATRY 220, 220 (1973) 
(finding that "crimes of violence committed by 533 mentally ill and mentally retarded offenders were 
quantitatively proportional to the number of crimes of violence committed by the total population.")). 
Ill. John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory 
and Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY I, 10 (1984). 
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violence, might show that mental health professional had at least some 
ability to make predictions. "2 Indeed, some studies from the late 1980s 
led researchers to conclude that, in contrast to long-term predictions, 
short-term predictions-those covering a period of a few days, a time 
period relevant, for example, to civil commitment-had a "high degree 
of ... predictive validity.,,113 
By the late 1990s, however, mental health professionals had 
developed new views about the accuracy of violence predictions, which 
led Professor Monahan to conclude that, contrary to what had seemed 
true a decade before, "clinicians are able to distinguish violent from 
nonviolent patients with a modest, better-than-chance level of 
accuracy.,,114 The scientific results that supported this new position did 
not involve new empirical findings, but a reinterpretation of available 
data. This reinterpretation involved application of techniques for 
quantifying diagnostic accuracy that had been used in radiologic studies 
since the 1970s 115 and that started appearing in mental health 
professionals' publications in the late 1980s.116 Underlying these 
techniques is the recognition that one can have varying levels of 
confidence in whether an either/or event will occur, and that a proper 
1l2.ld.atI0. 
113. Dale E. McNeil & Renee L. Binder, Predictive Validity of Judgments of Dangerousness in 
Emergency Civil Commitment, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 197, 197 (1987). 
114. John Monahan, Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Violence, in I MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (D. Faigman et al. eds., 1997) § 7-2.2[2], at 
317. See also John Monahan, The Scientific Status of Research on Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of 
Violence, SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES § 2-2.2.2, at 110-11 (D. 
Faigman et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Monahan, Scientific Status], providing "[f]our brief quotations 
[that] are representative of a growing consensus among researchers on risk assessment of violence" 
supporting the view that violence predictions are accurate. 
115. See, e.g., D. J. Goodenough et aI., Radiographic Applications of Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) Curves, 110 RADIOLOGY 89 (1974) (discussing the role of ROC analysis in 
quantifying radiologists' accuracy); and Barbara J. McNeil et aI., Measures of Clinical Efficacy. 
Cost-Effectiveness Calculations in the Diagnosis and Treatment of Hypertensive Renovascular Disease, 
293 NEW ENG. J. MED. 216 (1975) (discussing plotting of renogram data as ROC curves). 
116. Research psychologists outside the mental health field had recognized the potential value of 
ROC analysis. See, e.g., Richard C. Atkinson, A Variable Sensitivity Theory of Signal Detection, 70 
PSYCHOL. REV. 91 (1963) (discussing theoretical prediction of ROC curves in detecting signals in 
psychophysiological experiments); and, especially, DAVID M. GREEN & JOHN A. SWETS, SIGNAL 
DETECTION THEORY AND PSYCHOPHYSICS (1966) (a classic text in the field). It was much later, 
however, that mental health clinicians recognized the value of ROC methods for describing diagnostic 
accuracy. Three of the earliest such reports are Harold P. Erdman et aI., Suicide Risk Prediction by 
Computer Interview: A Prospective Study, 48 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 464 (1987); Jane M. Murphy et 
aI., Peiformance of Screening and Diagnostic Tests: Application of Receiver Operating Characteristic 
Analysis, 44 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 550 (1987); and Douglas Mossman & Eugene Somoza, 
Maximizing Diagnostic Information from the Dexamethasone Suppression Test: An Approach to 
Criterion Selection Using Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis, 46 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 
653 (1989). 
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description of detection accuracy will reflect these varying levels. 
a. An Imaginary Study 
To illustrate how these techniques work, consider the following 
dilemma face by the imaginary Dr. Jones, the unfortunate superintendent 
of the imaginary, SOO-bed Farblundget State Psychiatric Hospital 
(FSPH). Dr. Jones receives instructions telling him that, due to 
budgetary cutbacks, he must downsize the hospital by quickly releasing 
a substantial portion of its inpatients. I describe Dr. Jones as 
"unfortunate" for two reasons. First, the downsizing directive comes 
with the additional command not to release any "dangerous" patients. 
Faced with no alternative, Dr. Jones and his clinical staff set about to 
identify those patients who, they hope, have the best chance of not doing 
anything violent if they leave the hospital. 
After a week's effort, the FSPH staff have identified 163 patients 
who, they believe, have a low likelihood of doing violence if released to 
the community. Then, Dr. Jones learns of the second reason why he is 
unfortunate: budgetary constraints will require that FSPH close, and all 
500 of its patients will be released. 
Although this announcement is bad news for the FSPH staff who will 
lose their jobs (and, if one believes that psychiatric hospitalization is 
helpful, for the patients of FSPH), it is good news for social scientists, 
who now have "an excellent opportunity for naturalistic research" I 17 that 
will help them learn how accurately clinicians can predict violence. 
They decide to follow the former FSPH patients for the first year after 
their release, meeting with the former patients, talking with family 
members, and checking their police records to see whether they commit 
any violent acts. 118 In this study, any confirmable report of striking, 
physically fighting with, or doing physical harm to another person will 
identify a former patient as having been "violent." 
Twelve months after release, 125 former FSPH patients--one-fourth of 
those released-have committed acts that defme them as "violent." The 
first set of results from the study appear in Figure 1. Using these data, one 
can ask, "What is the likelihood that a patient whom the clinicians thought 
was too dangerous to release actually became violent?" 
117. MONAHAN, supra note 103, at 46. The quoted phrase is language Professor Monahan used to 
describe research on the transfer, following Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), of residents from 
former hospitals for the criminally insane to civil psychiatric hospitals. 
118. The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study used a similar method for following former 
inpatients in the community and detecting whether they had acted violently. See Steadman et aI., supra 
note 86, at 394 (contact every ten weeks with former inpatients and collateral informants). 
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Figure 1. - Results of the imaginary study of former FSPH patients, 
showing that about two-thirds of the patients who were not recommended 









~ Actually not violent 
N=375 
m Actually violent 
N=125 
Release opposed Release proposed ("not 
("dangerous") N=337 dangerous") N=163 
The answer (consistent with the study by Kozol and colleagues and the 
overall gist of Monahan's findings) was 112 out of 337 cases, or "about 
one-third of the time," which might lead to the interpretation that these 
clinicians "overpredicted" violence. Suppose one next asks how often 
the clinicians were correct. The data in Figure 1 suggest that whey were 
"right" about the 112 actually violent former patients whose release they 
opposed (the "true positives") and the 150 actually nonviolent former 
patients whose release they recommended (the "true negatives"). The 
FSPH clinicians thus correctly categorized 262 (about 52%) of the 
patients. Notice, though, that analyzed in this way, simply 
recommending that all patients be released would have yielded a higher 
correct percentage-75%. It thus seems as though the clinicians made 
more errors than they would have by simply accepting the base rate. 
Indeed, it often is the case that, when base rates of a phenomenon are 
low, one often can get more answers right by simply guessing that the 
phenomenon will not occur than by trying to figure out whether the 
phenomenon will occur. 
But the FSPH study has access to some additional data about the 
FSPH clinicians' decision-making, and Figure 2 summarizes these data. 
In making their judgments about dangerousness, FSPH clinicians 
conducted a risk assessment that ultimately placed patients in one of five 
levels of dangerousness. This meant that they could rank patients in five 
categories according to their perceived likelihood of being violent, from 
1 = "well below average" risk to 5 = "well above average" risk. 
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Figure 2. - Outcomes for imaginary FSPH patients by risk category. 
Notice that those patients who actually were violent tended to have had 
higher risk ratings than patients who were not violent following release. The 
Gaussian (normal, or "bell-shaped") distributions overlying the data suggest 
that violent patients fell about one standard deviation higher on the FSPH 
clinicians' latent decision axis. 
Risk Category: Outcomes: 
Actually not violent Actually violent 
1 = well below 
average 40 
2 = below 
average 
Decision 
3 = average threshold 
4 = above 
average 
5 = well above 15 
average 
200 150 100 50 0 50 100 
In other words, the clinicians had five levels of belief about patients' 
likelihood of post-hospitalization violence. The clinicians' discharge 
recommendations, which reflected their mandate not to release patients 
who were "dangerous," translated into proposals to discharge only those 
who had below-average levels of risk. The result was a discharge policy 
that was highly sensitive to violence at the expense of specificity in 
making recommendations about who should leave. Numerically, this 
sensitive-and-cautious policy is expressed in the finding that nearly 90% 
of the violent patients would not have been released had FSPH 
downsized but not closed, but only 40% of the nonviolent patients 
would have returned to the community. Put another way, the clinicians' 
perceived mandate made release of a dangerous (violent) patient-a 
"false negative" error-much worse than retention of a nondangerous 
(nonviolent) patient-a "false positive" error, and the clinicians 
responded accordingly. 
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b. ROC Analysis 
The statistical advance of the 1990s involved a recogmtIon that 
clinicians' decision thresholds could and should be separated from their 
judgments about levels of dangerousness, and that the accuracy of 
violence predictions should be judged using statistical methods that 
separate effects of base rates and decision thresholds from intrinsic 
detection capabilities. The statistical tool for accomplishing this is 
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis.119 Two articles 120 used 
this method to quantity prediction accuracy shortly after my 
recommendation, in 1994, that studies of violence prediction do so. \21 
As a way of demonstrating the value of ROC methods, I had reanalyzed 
a representative sample of existing data from both "first-" and "second-
generation" studies on violence prediction. The results led me to 
conclude that, in contrast to what courts and mental health publications 
had claimed, "clinicians are able to distinguish violent from nonviolent 
patients with a modest, better-than-chance level of accuracy," and that 
short-term predictions covering a week's time were not more accurate 
than predictions that covered periods of a year or more. 122 By the 
middle of the 21st century's first decade, ROC indices had become the 
standard way that investigators reported prediction accuracy in studies 
of violence prediction and of tools for predicting recidivism by sex 
offenders. 
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of patients in the clinicians' five-
category ratings as rectangular areas extending to the left (for nonviolent 
patients) or right (for violent patients) of the vertical axis. 
Superimposed on the rectangular distributions are two Gaussian 
("normal" or "bell-shaped") distributions. ROC analyses of prediction 
data often use a plot such as the one shown in Figure 3 to depict key 
features of these types of data. 
119. "Receiver operating characteristic" analysis reflects an early use of this statistical method-
describing the accuracy of radar during World War II. The notion is that radar detection capabilities (the 
ratio of "hits" to "false alarms") are characterized by the decision threshold at which the receiver 
operates. Larry B. Lusted, ROC Recollected, 4 MED. DECISION MAKING 131 (1984). 
120. Mamie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Violent Recidivism: Assessing Predictive Validity. 63 J. 
CONSULTING CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 737 (\995); William Gardner et aI., Clinical Versus Actuarial 
Predictions of Violence in Patients with Mental Illness, 64 J. CONSULTING CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 602 
( 1996). 
121. Mossman, Accuracy, supra note 86; Douglas Mossman, Further Comments on Portraying 
the Accuracy of Violence Predictions, 18 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 587 (1994). 
122. Mossman, Accuracy, supra note 86, at 790. 
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Figure 3. - ROC graph depicting the accuracy of the FSPH clinicians. 
Large circles are cut-ofts that would be formed by placing decision 
thresholds at the boundaries between the five risk categories in Figure 2. 
The curve (dashed line) linking the cut-ofts uses the "binormal assumption" 
of ROC analysis. 
.' • . 'f-• • -2 • 2-3 
o 0.5 
false positive rate (l-specificity) 
From looking at Figure 2, one sees that the five risk categories used by 
the FSPH clinicians actually gave them four potential decision 
thresholds (in addition to keeping everyone or discharging everyone) for 
making release recommendations. The threshold that the clinicians 
chose put them close to the desired goal of reducing the hospital 
population by one-third, but it also meant that they set their apparent 
sensitivity at 1121125 = 0.896 and their specificity at 150/375 = OAOO. 
Had they proposed discharging only patients whose dangerousness was 
"well below average," the effect of this threshold would be to increase 
sensitivity to 1231125 = 0.984, but to reduce specificity to 40/375 = 
0.107. Choosing other decision thresholds would have increased 
specificity at the cost of sensitivity. 
Figure 3 contains a ROC graph, which depicts the accuracy of the 
FSPH clinicians as a set of trade-offs between sensitivity and specificity 
as a detection method's decision threshold is moved throughout the 
entire range of possibilities. It is customary to do this by plotting the 
true positive rate of a detection method (equal to sensitivity) as a 
function of the false positive rate of the detection method (equal to 1 -
specificity). The large circles in Figure 3 represent the four cut-offs that 
would be formed by placing decision thresholds at the four boundaries 
between the FSPH clinicians' five categories of risk shown in Figure 2. 
The smooth ROC curve (in Figure 3, the dashed line) linking these four 
cut-offs derives from the "binormal assumption" of ROC analysis. 
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In the context of violence prediction, the binormal assumption 
suggests that discrimination capacity can be succinctly explained by 
assuming that the violence prediction method partially separates violent 
and nonviolent individuals along a continuous, latent decision axis. 123 
Along this axis, the violent and nonviolent populations form two 
overlapping, "normal" distributions with different means (or average 
values) and standard deviations (a statistical term that describes how 
"spread out" a distribution is). For our imaginary FSPH study, the 
binormal assumption states that we can think about the clinicians as 
potentially having the ability to rate each patient's violence risk along a 
continuum of risk-or, at least, along a latent decision axis with many, 
many gradations in risk levels. 
The binormal assumption helps us to recognize that, although intrinsic 
discriminatory power was limited by the clinicians' predictive abilities, 
the five categories of risk that the FSPH clinicians chose to use, and the 
boundaries (thresholds) between these categories, were somewhat 
arbitrary. The clinicians might have used three- or seven-category 
classifications of risk, and if they had done so, the number and location 
of the boundaries (thresholds) between categories would have had 
different locations along the underlying decision axis. 
ROe analysis gives investigators several ways of summarizing 
prediction accuracy, but for our purposes, we shall focus on three of 
these. First, the area under the curve (AVC) is a simple summary index 
of accuracy124 that, in the present context, has this practical 
interpretation: AUe equals the probability that the prediction method 
would give a randomly selected, actually violent person a higher score 
than a randomly selected, nonviolent person. A perfect violence 
prediction method-one that always would give a randomly chosen 
violent person a higher score than a randomly chosen nonviolent 
person-would have an AVe of 1.0. A violence prediction method that 
gave no information about future behavior-that is, a method that did no 
better than a coin toss at distinguishing a violent person from a 
nonviolent person-would have an AVe of 0.5. For the clinicians at 
123. Concerning the notion of a latent decision axis and the bi-normal model discussed here, see 
Charles E. Metz et ai., Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Receiver Operating Characteristic (Roc) 
Curves from Continuously-distributed Data, 17 STAT. MED. 1033, 1037 (1998). A highly technical 
discussion of problems related to this concept appears in Donald D. Dorfman & Kevin S. Berbaum, A 
Contaminated Binormal Model for ROC Data: Part I/, A Formal Model, 7 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 427 
(2000). The classic article on this topic is Donald D. Dorfman & Edward Alf Jr., Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation of Parameters of Signal Detection Theory and Determination of Confidence 1ntervals-
Raling Method Data, 6 J. MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOL. 487 (1969). 
124. James A. Hanley & Barbara J. McNeil, The Meaning and Use of the Area Under a Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve, 143 RADIOLOGY 29 (1982). 
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FSPH, Ave = 0.76, which is a fairly typical result in recent studies of 
methods used to predict or detect violence. 125 
A second way to characterize prediction accuracy makes reference to 
the effect size of the prediction method. Looking at the bell-shaped 
distributions in Figure 2, we see that the distribution for violent patients 
is displaced downward compared to the distribution of nonviolent 
patients; in this case, it turns out that the downward displacement equals 
one standard deviation. To put this another way: the size of the effect of 
the FSPH clinicians' assessment is equivalent to separating the 
distributions of violent and nonviolent patients by one standard 
deviation,126 or more simply, the effect size equals I. 
A third way of describing accuracy utilizes the binormal assumption 
and refers to the locations of the normal distributions along the latent 
decision axis. If we assign the mean and standard deviation of the 
nonviolent population the values of 0 and 1, respectively, then we can 
express the accuracy of a detection system (in this case, a system for 
detecting violent patients) using the following linear equation: 
[1 ] ZTPR = A + B.zFPR 
In Equation 1, ZTPR and ZFPR are the normal deviates, or z-transforms, of 
the true and false positive rates, respectively; A equals the distance 
between the means of the violent and nonviolent populations, measured 
in units of the standard deviation of the nonviolent population; and B 
equals the ratio of the standard deviations (SD) of the nonviolent and 
violent populations (i.e., SDvJSDv+). When B=I (as is the case for the 
125. See. e.g., Mamie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Violent Recidivism: Assessing Predictive 
Validity, 63 J. CONSULTING CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 737 (1995) (AUC = 0.76 for re-offending); Kevin S. 
Douglas et aI., Assessing Risk for Violence Among Psychiatric Patients: The HCR-20 Violence Risk 
Assessment Scheme and the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version, 67 J. CONSULTING CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 917 (1999) (AUC = 0.76 for any physical violence); Michael J. Furlong & Michael P. Bates, 
Predicting School Weapon Possession: A Secondary Analysis of the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance 
Survey, 38 PSYCHOL. SCH. 127 (2001) (AUC = 0.75 for weapons possession at school); Kevin S. 
Douglas & James R. Ogloff, Violence by Psychiatric Patients: The Impact of Archival Measurement 
Source on Violence Base Rates and Risk Assessment Accuracy, 48 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 734, 738 (2003) 
(AUCs of 0.72 to 0.80 for community violence, variously defined). 
126. Often, studies refer to the effect size as "Cohen's d," acknowledging a frequently cited book 
concerning this statistic. See Jacob Cohen, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES (1969); Jacob Cohen, Quantitative Methods in Psychology: A Power Primer, 112 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 155 (1992). One can convert Cohen'S d to another statistic, the common language effect size, or 
CL. K. O. McGraw & S. P. Wong, A Common Language Effect Size Statistic, III PSYCHOL. BULL. 361 
(1992). Under most circumstances, CL is roughly equal to AUC. For further discussion of these 
relationships, see Mamie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Comparing Effect Sizes in Follow-up Studies: ROC 
Area. Cohen's d, and r, 29 L. HUM. BEHA V. 615 (2005). 
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FSPH dataI27), then A equals the effect size. 
2. The Association Between Violence and Mental Disorder 
As was noted earlier, the limited evidence available in the 1970s and 
1980s suggested no association between mental illness and violence, 
once one factored in sociodemographic factors that were known to raise 
violence risk. However, the 1990s witnessed the accumulation of 
scientific studies that showed that mental illness was a definite risk 
factor for acting violently, though a relatively minor one. 
The first of these study appeared in July 1990. Swanson and 
colleagues l28 used data originally gathered in the 1980s for the 
Epidemiologic Catchment Area studies to calculate the rates of various 
mental disorders in the United States. 129 While gathering these data, 
researchers had also asked participants about whether they had 
committed various types of violent acts in the year before the interview. 
Reanalyzing these data allowed Swanson and colleagues to show that 
the presence of substance use problems or serious mental illnesses 
127. I created data such that B=I for this Article so as to simplify, without loss of generality, some 
subsequent calculations. For further discussion of the bi-nonnal assumption in this context, including 
values of B, see Mossman, Accuracy, supra note 86, at 785, 788; and Douglas Mossman, 
Dangerousness Decisions: An Essay on the Mathematics of Clinical Violence Predictions and 
Involuntary Hospitalization, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95,116-17, nn. 67, 68 (1995) [hereinafter 
Mossman, Dangerousness Decisions]. 
128. Jeffrey W. Swanson et aI., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: Evidence 
from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 761, (1990). 
129. The Epidemiologic Catchment Area (ECA) collected data in 1980-85 on the prevalence and 
incidence of mental disorders in five U.S. areas: New Haven, Baltimore, St. Louis, Durham (North 
Carolina), and Los Angeles. At each site, data gatherers interviewed more than 3,000 community 
residents and 500 residents of institutions, yielding more than 20,000 respondents overall. Interviewers 
used the Diagnostic Interview Schedule (DIS), which had been developed by the National Institute of 
Mental Health to pennit trained nonprofessionals to obtain infonnation about several psychiatric 
disorders, including mania, depression, schizophrenia, alcohol dependence, and antisocial personality. 
For a fuller description, see Daniel A. Regier et aI., The NIMH Epidemiologic Catchment Area 
Program: Historical Context, Major Objectives, and Study Population Characteristics, 41 ARCHIVES 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 934 (\984). 
Among the items contained in the DIS were the following five questions: 
• Did you ever hit or throw things at your wife/ husband/partner? [If so] were you ever the one who 
threw things first, regardless of who started the argument? Did you hit or throw things first 
on more than one occasion? 
• Have you ever spanked or hit a child (yours or anyone else's) hard enough so that he or she had 
bruises or had to stay in bed or see a doctor? 
• Since age 18, have you been in more than one fight that came to swapping blows, other than 
fights with your husband/wipe/partner? 
• Have you ever used a weapon like a stick, knife, or gun in a fight since you were 18? 
• Have you ever gotten into physical fights while drinking? 
Monahan, SCientific Status, supra note 114, at 94 n.ll. 
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increased violence rates among adults, even after one controlled 
statistically for a person's sex, age, and income level. 
In 1992, Link and colleagues l30 published findings from another study 
that took advantage of previously gathered, archival data. The nature of 
these data allowed Link and colleagues to use statistical methods to 
control for several demographic variables, even including the 
neighborhood where an individual lived. After factoring in this more 
extensive set of variables, Link and colleagues still could show that 
having been a "mental patient,,131 statistically increased a person's risk 
of violence. 132 
Several similar studies followed, with the result being that, by the end 
of the 1990s, mental health professionals could no longer deny that 
psychiatric disorders were an independent risk factor for acting 
violently. One could certainly point to groups of people with higher 
rates of violence than persons with psychiatric disorders,133 and one 
could certainly point to other common social factors (e.g., violence on 
television and other visual media) with solid causative links to 
violence.134 Nonetheless, the link between mental disorder and violence 
that formed the implicit rationale of Tarasoff and its progeny had 
achieved a statistical vindication. 
3. Changes in Risk Assessment "Technology" 
The 1990s also witnessed the beginnings and dissemination of a new 
approach to, or "technology" for, making violence risk assessments. 
130. Bruce O. Link et aI., The Violent and Illegal Behavior of Mental Patients Reconsidered, 57 
AM. SOc. REv. 275 (1992). 
131. The data on this study's "mental patients" came from inpatient and outpatient psychiatric 
patients receiving treatment at the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center. ld. at 279. 
132. Jd. at 285-288 (table shows predictive value of having been a patient, despite controlling 
statistically for other variables). 
133. Professor Monahan summarizes: 
The policy implications of mental disorder as a risk factor for violent behavior can be 
understood only in relative terms. Compared to the magnitude of risk associated with the 
combination of male gender, young age, and lower socioeconomic status, for example, 
the risk of violence presented by mental disorder is modest. Compared to the magnitude 
of risk associated with alcoholism and other drug abuse, the risk associated with "major" 
mental disorders ... is modest indeed. Clearly, mental health status makes at best a 
trivial contribution to the overall level of violence in society. 
Monahan, Scientific Status, supra note 114, at 108-09. 
134. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson et aI., The Influence of Media Violence on Youth, 4 PSYCHOL 
SCI. PUB. [NT, 81 (2003). 
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Before \990, most studies of psychiatric violence prediction 
examined efforts in which mental health professionals had used their 
"clinical judgment" to gauge violence and make decisions relevant to 
patients. In the context of violence prediction, the exercise of "clinical 
judgment" refers to a process in which a decision-maker combines data 
mentally ("in his head") when assessing a person's risk of becoming 
violent. In theory at least, clinical judgments about dangerousness 
incorporate a psychiatrist's or psychologist's professional knowledge, 
personal experience, "gut" feelings, intuitions about the evaluee, and 
whatever other information about the situation that seems relevant to the 
assessment. Clinical judgment is the method physicians usually use to 
evaluate and treat patients: doctors listen to patients and examine them, 
think about and decide what probably is wrong, then recommend 
treatments. 135 
Life insurance actuaries do not use clinical judgment when making 
assessments of an individual's life-span. Instead, they use formulae, 
tables, algorithms, or other pre-specified ways of combining information 
to estimate life expectancy. For this reason, psychologists have adopted 
the term "actuarial" to describe methods of prediction that resemble the 
processes an insurance actuary uses to formulate a judgment about the 
risk of a future event. 136 Actuarial prediction techniques are established, 
and their claims to accuracy rest upon, empirically determined 
relationships between specific types of data and the event to be 
predicted. Because actuarial methods of judgment use fixed, predeter-
mined, empirically based techniques to combine data and render 
assessments of future events, they are also called "statistical," 
"mechanical," or "formal" methods for making judgments. 137 
In the 1990s, mental health literature witnessed the publication of 
several studies that described the capacities of actuarial "technology" in 
assessing the risk of future violence. This technology typically requires 
clinicians to gather infonnation about ten to twenty factors concerning 
the individuals undergoing evaluation. The clinicians then score that 
information about each factor using an instruction manual or some other 
135. Although we do not usually think about our doctors' actions as predictions, it is reasonable to 
do so. When they select treatments, our doctors are making judgments that the proposed treatment will 
(or is very likely to) remedy our ailments. 
136. Robyn M. Dawes et aI., Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCI. 1668 (1989). For a 
non-insurance example, see Sei l. Lee et aI., Development and Validation of a Prognostic Index for 
4-Year Mortality in Older Adults, 295 lAMA 801 (2006). 
137. William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, 
Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical 
Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 293 (1996). 
HeinOnline -- 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 566 2006-2007
566 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
pre-specified method. This process generates a numerical value or 
category that describes the evaluees' risk of violence. 
By now, the social science literature contains scores of studies of 
actuarial prediction methods yielding results that imply well-above-
chance levels of predictive accuracy. Some writers, partly on the basis 
of research findings demonstrating the superiority of actuarial judgments 
in a host of other types of predictions,138 interpret available violence 
prediction research as showing that actuarial measures are clearly 
superior to clinical judgments in predicting future violence. 139 Indeed, 
one research group advocates for "the complete replacement of existing 
practice [i.e., using clinical jUdgment] with actuarial methods.,,140 This 
recommendation probably is "premature,,141 and ignores the limitations 
of currently available tools to implement actuarial judgment. 142 Yet 
even skeptical commentators recognize that available evidence shows 
that actuarial judgment "can enhance a variety of dangerousness risk 
assessments," and clinicians who perfonn "risk assessments have a 
professional responsibility to be aware of the advantages and limitations 
of using such risk assessment toolS.,,143 
The available research also shows that actuarial measures are far from 
perfect at distinguishing those individuals who will be violent from 
those who will not. As was the case with the imaginary FSPH study, 
real-life studies of actuarial violence prediction report AVes of 0.70 to 
0.80. That is, studies of actuarial judgment show that the score 
distributions of violent and nonviolent individuals have considerable 
overlap. True, the scores of violent subjects are, on average, higher than 
the scores of nonviolent subjects, so that, as the score increases, the 
probability of violence increases. But this means that a user of a 
138. William M. Grove et aI., Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-Analysis, 12 
PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 19 (2000). 
139. E.g., Mossman, Accuracy, supra note 86, at 789 (predictions using past behavior and 
discriminant functions appear better than clinical judgment); William Gardner et aI., Clinical Versus 
Actuarial Predictions of Violence in Patients With Mental Illnesses. 64 J. CONSULTING CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 602, 602 (1996) ("Actuarial predictions based only on patients' histories of violence were 
more accurate than clinical predictions, as were actuarial predictions that did not use information about 
histories."); and Mamie E. Rice, et aI., The Appraisal of Violence Risk, 15 CURRENT OPINION 
PSYCHIATRY 589, 589 (2002) ("evidence favoring actuarial methods for appraising the risk of violence 
is increasing"). 
140. VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: ApPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 171 
(1998). 
141. Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL'y & L. 409,410 (2001). 
142. I discuss some of these limitations in Douglas Mossman, Another Look at Interpreting Risk 
Categories, SEXUAL ABUSE: J. REs. TREATMENT (forthcoming 2006). 
143. Litwack, supra note 141, at 438. 
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violence risk assessment must recognize that a decision to take some 
course of action comes not from the risk assessment itself, but from a 
judgment about what level of risk should trigger that course of action. 
A patient either will or will not act violently, and a therapist treating 
that patient can either take or not take a course of action to intervene. 
But, as is the case with our knowledge about most future events, a 
therapist's predictive knowledge about future violence is really an 
ability to make risk estimates or to assess the likelihood of violence. 
Probabilities, however, cannot tell us what level of violence risk justifies 
a course of preventive action. Whether to act, given a particular 
probability of violence, is something the therapist must decide 
independently. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF A DECISION THRESHOLD 
A. Implications of 1990s Advances 
The notion that a therapist's foreknowledge of a patient's 
dangerousness is represented by degrees or levels of violence risk, rather 
than a yes-or-no judgment about whether violence will occur, has 
unavoidable consequences for the implementation of risk assessments. 
The Tarasoff decision recognizes that therapists exercising their best 
professional judgment may still make prediction mistakes,144 which 
could include false positive errors that either wrongfully attribute 
"serious danger" to persons who will not become violent,145 and false 
negative errors that "miss" patients who later act violently. Yet, in 
telling therapists neither to "routinely ... reveal such threats" nor to 
"disclose a confidence unless such disclosure is necessary to avert 
danger to others,,,146 Tarasoff fails to recognize that therapists do not 
have yes-or-no advance knowledge about whether a threat (or other 
behavior) implies that a disclosure is necessary because of future 
violence. At best, therapists know about probabilities or (more often) 
degrees of relative risk. This means that what must trigger a therapist's 
144. See TarasofJ II, 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976) (recognizing "the difficulty that a therapist 
encounters in attempting to forecast whether a patient presents a serious danger of violence .... [P]roof, 
aided by hindsight, that he or she judged wrongly is insufficient to establish negligence."). 
145. In his dissent, Justice Clark notes that, "under existing psychiatric procedures only a 
relatively few receiving treatment will ever present a risk of violence, the number making threats is 
huge, and it is the latter group-not just the former-whose treatment will be impaired and whose risk 
of commitment will be increased" by the majority's ruling. TarasofJ II, 55 I P.2d at 360 (Clark, J., 
dissenting). 
146. Id. at 347. 
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decision to take protective action can only be the therapist's perception 
of a sufficient likelihood that violence will occur-not a yes-or-no 
detennination by the therapist that a "serious danger of violence" has 
presented itself. 147 As Dr. Paul Appelbaum has noted, Tarasoff(like the 
decisions that have followed it) implies that the duty to protect arises 
"only when a threshold of probability is crossed.,,148 
What, then, constitutes a "threshold of probability" that tells a 
therapist what likelihood of violence is "sufficient" to warrant protective 
action? Here is Dr. Appelbaum's answer: "the tenns used to define that 
threshold have varied, and never has it been specified with any 
precision. ,,149 
B. Balancing in Law and in Dangerousness Decisions 
Figure 2 provides some clues about the type of infonnation one might 
use in an attempt to find a decision threshold. As we saw earlier, each 
of the four boundaries between the FSPH clinicians' five risk categories 
could function as a threshold (or cut-off point) for making a release 
decision. Associated with each threshold is a specific set of correct 
prediction rates (that is, true positive and true negative rates) and 
incorrect prediction rates (false positive and false negative rates). These 
prediction rates, in turn, reflect three factors: (l) the number of rating 
categories the clinicians used (in this case, five), (2) the location, along 
the implicit decision axis, of the boundaries between those categories, 
and (3) the intrinsic accuracy of the clinicians' underlying decision 
technique, represented by the two nonnal distributions that appear in 
Figure 2, and summarized by Equation 1, with A=l and B=l. 
At least in theory, the FSPH clinicians could have used a larger 
number of categories in their risk classification, ISO or (again, in theory) 
147. One can argue that I am intentionally misinterpreting, or at least being unfair to, the 
majority's opinion. One could say that, in requiring protective action when a "patient presents a serious 
danger of violence to another," TarasoJf 1/, 551 P.2d at 340, the majority implicitly acknowledges that 
some patients' statements or behaviors may represent what might be called "non serious" or "Iess-than-
serious" dangers. But this begs the question by assuming that a therapist's advance perception of risk 
cleanly distinguishes those risks that are "serious" and those that are not. Perception of risk is not a yes-
or-no phenomenon, but a matter of degree, and no perceptual boundary defines those risks that are 
"serious. " 
148. Paul S. Appelbaum, Ask the Experts, 17 AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. NEWSL. 19, 19 (1992). 
149. Jd. 
150. This is possible using various available assessment instruments. For example, the HCR-20 
has forty-one potential scores, because evaluees can obtain scores from 0 (lowest risk) to 40 (highest 
risk). For a review of the HCR-20, see Douglas Mossman, Evaluating Violence Risk "By the Book": A 
Review ofHCR-20: Assessing Risk/or Violence, Version 2 and the Manual/or the Sexual Violence Risk-
20, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 781 (2000). 
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they could have used a different number of rating categories with 
potential boundaries different from those shown in Figure 2. In other 
words, the number of boundaries (or decision thresholds) along the axis 
is as large as the number of measurement gradations in the clinicians' 
risk assessment. Within the limits of these gradations, the FSPH 
clinicians would be free to fine-tune a decision threshold for 
recommending release so as to achieve whatever they believed was the 
optimum balance of correct predictions versus incorrect predictions. 
Here, the trade-offs involve monetary savings from discharging 
nonviolent patients and public safety gained by retaining violent patients 
(both good things), versus needless retention of nonviolent patients and 
release of violent persons (both bad things). 
The notion that balancing errors should serve as a guide to 
imperfectly accurate legal decisions is well established in criminal law, 
where numerous cases discuss the appropriate ratio of wrongful 
acquittals to wrongful convictions. 151 Around the time of the Tarasoff 
decisions, a few commentators recognized that the duty to warn or 
protect the public raised a similar problem of balancing errors-for 
example, a balancing of wrongful decisions to involuntarily hospitalize 
patients out of a misplaced fear of future violence with wrongful 
decisions not to hospitalize patients who go on to do violence. Here are 
two examples of such considerations: 
Assume that one person out of a thousand will kill. Assume also that an 
exceptionally accurate test is created which differentiates with 95% 
effectiveness those who will kill from those who will not. If 100,000 
people were tested, out of the 100 who would kill 95 would be isolated. 
Unfortunately, out of the 99,900 who would not kill, 4,995 people would 
also be isolated as potential killers. In these circumstances, it is clear that 
we could not justify incarcerating all 5,090 people. If, in the criminal 
law, it is better that ten guilty men go free than that one innocent man 
suffer, how can we say in the civil commitment area that it is better that 
fifty-four harmless people be incarcerated lest one dangerous man be 
lSI. The best known ratio is Blackstone's (10:1), derived from the great commentator's oft-
quoted view that "it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer." WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *352. Other historical authorities have suggested other ratios for 
wrongful acquittals and convictions. See. e.g., MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (reprint of 1678 
ed., Oxford, Professional Books, 1972) (suggesting a 5:1 ratio); and J. FORTESCUE, A LEARNED 
COMMUNICATION OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (reprint of 1567 ed., New York, W. J. Johnson, 1969) 
(suggesting a 20: 1 ratio). An amusing and thorough review of this issue in criminal law is provided by 
Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997). Two examples of mathematical 
analyses of this issue are David H. Kaye, Clarifoing the Burden o/Persuasion: What Bayesian Decision 
Rules Do and Do Not Do, 3 lNT'L J. EVIDENCE PROOF 1 (1999); and Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. 
Friedman, The Suggestibility 0/ Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 33 (2000). 
HeinOnline -- 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 570 2006-2007
570 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
free?152 
[I]t may be possible ethically to justify short-term cqmmitment even if the 
predictions of imminent violence on which it is based are less accurate 
than the long-term research indicates. Paraphrasing Blackstone, it may be 
better that ten "false positives" suffer commitment for three days than that 
one "false negative" go free to kill someone during that period. 153 
Similar reasoning (though without any numerical specification) appears 
to underlie the "clear and convincing" standard of proof in civil 
commitment hearings established in Addington v. Texas: 
One who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in need of 
treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma .... It cannot be 
said, therefore, that it is much better for a mentally ill person to "go free" 
than for a mentally normal person to be committed. 154 
Previous sections of this Article have explained the types of evidence 
showing that when violence "prediction" is redefmed as an ability to rank 
relative risk of future violence, clinicians do better-than-chance at ranking 
individuals. As we have seen, though, that evidence also shows that 
rankings are imperfect, and that decisions based on such rankings 
inevitably involve errors. Can we find a way to decide upon an optimal 
balancing of those errors? For example, we might ask, as Professor 
Monahan and colleagues have, "How many safe people should be 
hospitalized as 'dangerous' to prevent discharging one patient who turns 
out to be violent?" In contrast to what we find in the criminal law, "No 
court has ever answered that question with a number. Judges are 
notoriously reluctant to set decision thresholds that depend on overt cost-
152. Dennis W. Daley, Comment, Tarasoff and the Psychotherapist's Duty to Warn, 12 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 932, 942-943 n.75 (1975). 
153. John Monahan, Strategies for the Empirical Analysis of the Prediction of Violence in Civil 
Commitment, I L. HUM. BEHAV. 363, 370 (1977). 
Monahan's approach is commonly applied to medical decisions (and other types of judgments), 
under terms such as the "preferred marginal tradeoff' or "number needed to treat." In medical contexts, 
the preferred marginal tradeoff usually 
is the number of treatment errors [i.e., treatments of persons without disease) that are 
acceptable in order to treat correctly one additional person with the disease. In the 
framework of utility theory, the preferred marginal tradeoff is equivalent to the ratio of 
the net benefit of treating a diseased person to the net harm of treating a well person, so it 
is independent of disease prevalence. 
Peter DeNeef & Daniel L. Kent, Using Treatment-tradeoff Preferences to Select Diagnostic Strategies: 
Linking the ROC Curve to Threshold Analysis, 13 MED. DECISION MAKING 126, 126 (1993) (emphasis 
in the original). An application of the number needed to treat metric appears in Alec Buchanan & 
Morven Leese Detention of People with Dangerous Severe Personality Disorders: a Systematic Review, 
358 LANCET 1955, 1957 (2001). 
154. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (internal citations omitted). 
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benefit consideration[s], as are many other professionals and officials." I 55 
C. What Is the Threshold? 
1. Previously Published Research l56 
I believe that judges will never set a rational decision threshold 
because there is no social agreement about such a probability, and I have 
done two empirical studies to show that this is so. Both studies used the 
following reasoning. 
Often, potentially violent persons with apparent mental problems are 
transported to psychiatric emergency rooms such as the one at 
University Hospital in Cincinnati. In the ER, it is difficult for patients to 
walk out, and therefore relatively easy for clinicians to fulfill the 
psychiatric duty to protect by arranging for involuntary hospitalization. 
Although this practice may benefit the public by confining persons who 
would otherwise commit violence in the community, it deprives persons 
who are hospitalized of their liberty. Because violence psychiatric 
predictions are not perfectly accurate, involuntary hospitalization would 
confine some patients who would not have been violent if had they been 
released. 
Suppose that ER clinicians made decisions about hospitalization using 
a Future Violence Test (FVT) such as the one shown in Figure 4, which 
had the same (typical) accuracy as the prediction method used by the 
FSPH clinicians. 157 Suppose, for purposes of clarity in exposition, that 
persons evaluated with the FVT could score from 0 to 100, with higher 
scores implying higher likelihoods of violence in the near future. To use 
the FVT, ER clinicians would need to pick a decision threshold, or cut-
off score about which a patient would be hospitalized.1 5s 
155. John A. Swets et aI., Psychological Science Can Improve Diagnostic Decisions, I 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. PUB. INT. I, 22 (2000). However, we should note that the Comment quoted 
supra, text at note 152, is cited in its entirety in Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 735 
(Cal. 1980), which seemingly implies endorsement-without a definite numerical answer-for some 
kinds of cost-benefit balancing. 
156. This section is adapted from Douglas Mossman & Kathleen J. Hart, How Bad Is Civil 
Commitment? A Study of Attitudes Toward Violence and Involuntary Hospitalization, 21 BULL. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 181, 182-90 (1993); and Mossman, Rabbi's Sermon, supra note 28, at 360-61. 
157. That is, the effect size is I. On the FVT scale depicted in Figure 4, the mean of the 
nonviolent persons is 45, and the mean of the vi~lent persons is 55; both distributions have standard 
deviations of 10. 
158. What I present here is a simplified discussion of how one would operationalize a detection 
method. For a more extensive discussion, see Mossman, Dangerousness Decisions, supra note 127, at 
106-125. 
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Figure 4. - Score distributions for a "Future Violence Test" (FVT), with 
accuracy typical of actuarial methods of risk assessment. Dashed lines 
represent possible cut-offs or decision thresholds. Arrows are cut-offs that 
corresponds to the central 80 percent of responses depicted in Figure 5. 
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Figure 4 includes three vertical lines representing three possible FVT 
decision thresholds (at 40, 50, and 60). At each threshold, patients with 
scores greater than the cut-off are deemed "positive," that is, their risk of 
violence is deemed high enough to make them subject to involuntary 
hospitalization; patients with scores below the threshold are "negative" 
and are not subject to hospitalization. Moving the decision threshold 
changes the outcomes. For example, as the threshold decreases, more of 
the actually violent persons are hospitalized (because lower thresholds 
increase the sensitivity of the FVT), but more nonviolent patients are 
also hospitalized, because the probability of correctly identifying 
nonviolent patients person (the FVT's specificity) decreases. 
Given that errors are inevitable, the rational way to choose a decision 
threshold would be to find the value of the FVT that strikes the right 
balance of correct and incorrect decisions about patients, given the 
values that we assign to incorrect and correct decisions. That is, we 
would like to find an FVT score that produces the highest expected 
utility; that point, by definition, would be the best threshold. Though not 
all the decisions made using this cut-off score would produce correct 
predictions about violence, using this score would produce the best 
balance of erroneous and correct predictions. 159 
159. "[S]ome kinds of errors may be much more important than other kinds, and the 'best' 
strategy [for predicting violence] should take into account the relative 'weights' or 'costs' of different 
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Our task, then, is to find a way to assign values to the possible 
outcomes of a decision about hospitalization, making use of some 
formal methods for quantifying utilities that have appeared in the 
decision analysis literature. 16o This will allow us to make mathematical 
calculations and discover the optimal decision threshold. 161 In the 
remarks quoted above, Monahan suggests that, when it comes to civil 
commitment, false negative mistakes (releasing dangerous patients) are 
much worse than false positive mistakes (hospitalizing nondangerous 
patients). But exactly how much worse? Do people agree, at least 
roughly, about how bad violence is compared to involuntary 
hospitalization? How could we find a way to answer these questions, 
that is, to get people to compare experiencing violence with 
experiencing involuntary hospitalization? 
When most people (for example, legal decision-makers including 
legislators and judges) think about decisions to keep someone 
psychiatrically hospitalized, they think about the potential consequences 
for the public at large. From this perspective, a mental health 
professional's predictions about violence can lead either to (I) no one's 
being harmed, which occurs when the professional makes correct 
predictions that violence will or will not occur (that is, true positive or 
true negative predictions), or (2) a violent attack following a 
professional's incorrect (false negative) prediction of nonviolence. But 
notice that this perspective assumes one is not a patient: it does not take 
into account the experience of a nonviolent patient who, because of a 
prediction of violence, undergoes an involuntary hospitalization. The 
studies that I have conducted require individuals to consider the 
perspective of the patient as well as the perspective of the "public" 
whose safety is to be protected. Thus, the studies require subjects to 
think about releasing or involuntarily hospitalizing someone as possible 
outcomes that could happen to them. 162 
In a study I conducted with Professor Kathleen Hart, we told our 
study subjects (young adults attending Xavier University and the 
University of Cincinnati's medical school) to imagine they were helping 
kinds of mistakes." MONAHAN, supra note 103, at 46-47. 
160. See, e.g., SIMON FRENCH, DECISION THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MATHEMATICS OF 
RATIONALITY (1988); and the classic text, R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND 
DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY (1957). 
161. For a short discussion, see Douglas Mossman & Eugene Somoza, Balancing Risks and 
Benefits: Another Approach to Optimizing Diagnostic Tests, 4 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLINICAL 
NEUROSCIENCES 33 I (1992). 
162. Although a full discussion of this assumption lies beyond the scope of this article, my intent 
was to have subjects consider outcomes of involuntary hospitalization from a frame of reference 
analogous to John Rawls's "initial position." See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-22 (1971). 
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to calibrate a Future Violence Test, specifically, to provide information 
that would allow mental health professionals balance incorrect 
predictions of violence and nonviolence. The key set of questions asked 
subjects to compare having to spend various lengths of time as a patient 
in state hospital to being attacked by a man wielding a knife. We asked 
them to consider how they would feel about experiencing each 
alternative "right now," and to tell us which . alternative they would 
prefer. 163 
The answers we received spanned the entire range of time periods 
about which we asked, with (on one end of the spectrum) many subjects 
preferring several years of confinement and (on the other end) many 
subjects who would not want be willing to spend a day in a psychiatric 
ward to avoid a being attacked by a man wielding a knife. l64 In contrast 
to what Professor Monahan had suggested, many of our subjects gave 
answers implying that, when they considered the consequences of a false 
positive decision (a decision to hospitalize a nonviolent person for a few 
days) as happening to them, that decision seemed far worse than a false 
negative decision (a decision to release a violent person). The five-
orders-of-magnitude I65 span of responses that we obtained suggested 
that, even in a fairly homogeneous group of persons, there was no social 
agreement on the right balance of correct and incorrect decisions about 
future violence. 
2. Mental Health Professionals-Unpublished Research 
Wondering whether mental health professionals might express more 
agreement166 than did our set of young adult subjects, I conducted a 
similar study in October 2001. 
163. We asked subjects to consider periods of hospitalization ranging from three hours to ten years. The 
subjects could respond that they preferred being attacked or undergoing hospitalization for the period of time, 
or they could say they felt "about the same" regarding the alternatives. Details of the data collection procedures 
appear in Mossman & Hart, supra note 156, at 185-87. 
164. The shortest period about which we inquired was three hours because, before conducting the study, 
we guessed that anyone would be willing to spend three hours in a psychiatric ward to avoid a knife attack. 
But, to our surprise, we found that several subjects preferred a knife attack to spending even three hours as an 
inpatient 
165. Ten years equals 87,600 hours. Assuming that the individuals who would not undergo three hours 
of hospitalization would agree to one hour, the ratio of highest to lowest acceptable time periods was nearly 
\05. 
166. I thought there might be more agreement because mental health professionals would be less averse 
to hospitalization, and that few if any of them would prefer a knife attack to being hospitalized for a few days. I 
was wrong. 
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Figure 5. - Mental health professionals' responses to beings asked 
whether they would prefer being attacked by a man wielding a knife or 
spending a certain time period in the hospital. Vertical lines represent 
ranges of time periods about which a subject could not express a 
preference. Arrows designate time periods marking the middle 80 percent 
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This time, the subjects, who were attending a presentation on violence 
prediction, included 141 mental health professionals167 ranging in age 
from 22 to 77 years (mean and median age = 45 years). 
This second study's key finding-which has not been previously 
published-is that the range of responses given by mental health 
professionals was similar to the range of answers from the first study's 
participants. As with the previous study, 1 asked subjects whether they 
would prefer being attacked by a man wielding a knife or spending a 
certain time period in the hospital. Subjects could respond "I don't 
know" if they were not sure whether they would prefer being attacked or 
the time period about which they were asked. For purposes of data 
interpretation, 1 calculated, for each subject, the geometric of the 
shortest time period for which the subject chose hospitalization and the 
167. Among those who identified their sex, 31% were women. Those who identified their 
professions included twenty-eight counselors, twenty-eight psychologists and psychology trainees, 
twelve nurses, seventeen psychiatrists and psychiatry residents, and fifty-two social workers. 
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longest time for which the subject chose the attack. 168 In Figure 5, 
subjects' responses are ordered left to right according to this geometric 
mean; vertical lines represent ranges of time periods about which 
subjects could not express a preference. As Figure 5 shows, more than a 
tenth of the subjects thought that it might be better to spend two years or 
more in a hospital than be attacked by a man wielding a knife, and a 
similarly fraction preferred being attacked to spending seven days as a 
psychiatric inpatient. 
Suppose that, to operationalize the FVT, we choose to ignore the 
feelings of the ten percent of subjects at the lowest end and the ten 
percent at the highest end of the distribution. That is, we take only the 
middle 80% to decide what range of cut-offs or decision threshold might 
be acceptable. The arrows in Figure 4 indicate the result: the range of 
thresholds lies between 17 and 62, that is, a range that includes decision 
thresholds implying hospitalization of virtually everyone (violent and 
nonviolent alike) to a threshold where 76% of the violent patients are 
released. 169 
D. Conclusion: No Agreement, and an Insoluble Dilemma 
The results of these two studies show that if, as fairness requires, 
people are asked to consider the effects of involuntary hospitalization on 
those who are confined along with the benefits that confinement may 
give to society, people express very diverse views. This is true even in a 
situation where the threat (being attacked at a specific moment by an 
assailant whose choice of weapon is known) and its alternative 
(psychiatric hospitalization) are specified to a much greater degree than 
happens in real-life evaluations conducted in mental health 
professionals' offices or psychiatric emergency rooms. If it is the case, 
as Professor Monahan and colleagues suggest, that courts are reluctant 
to provide overt, numerical rules about balancing public safety and 
individual liberty, these studies' findings show that courts have a good 
reason to avoid doing so: even homogeneous groups of people cannot 
168. For example, suppose a subject preferred being hospitalized for one month to being attacked, 
preferred being attacked to spending one year in the hospital, and said "I don't know" concerning 
intermediate time periods (i.e., two, three, and six months). The geometric mean (in days) of one month 
and one year is (30 x 365)Y' = 104.6, which was the value used to order that subject's responses. 
169. The derivation ofthese results appears in Appendix I of this Article. 
One might conclude that this at least shows agreement that the individuals with the highest probability 
of violence should be hospitalized. But this is not true. The calculations do not take into account 
uncertainty in the estimated base rate of violence, which I have arbitrarily set a 10% for sample 
calculation. Factoring in this uncertainty would lead to an even wider span of acceptable cut-offs. See 
Mossman, Dangerousness Decisions, supra note 127, at 120-125. 
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agree on how much of their own liberty they would sacrifice to prevent 
violence. 
Though violence prediction tools might be accurate, there would be 
no social agreement about using these tools, which would require 
establishing what probability of risk necessitated taking steps to protect 
third parties. In other words, even though mental health professionals 
can accurately rank individuals' risk of violence, society cannot agree 
upon what level of risk is "serious" enough to trigger a Tarasoff-type 
response to future danger. 
Moreover, it appears that there is no agreement about risk levels even 
among judges. A study conducted by Professor Monahan and his 
colleague Eric Silver asked judges what minimum level of risk of 
violence would justify authorizing civil commitment. The judges gave 
answers that ranged from 1 % to 56%.170 This provides yet another 
demonstration that, even within homogeneous groups, there is a wide 
divergence of beliefs about what probability of violence justifies a 
specific action to avert danger. 
Thus, thirty years after Tarasoff, scientific findings suggest that the 
decision contains an inescapable contradiction. In a situation such as the 
one presented to Poddar's therapists, a clinician has an obligation to 
apply standards of his profession to determine whether his patient 
represents a "serious danger of violence." The therapist then may-
depending on whether he believes the patient represents a "serious 
danger"-have an obligation to respond protectively through some 
course of action. Yet the therapist also knows that there is and can be no 
rationally established, broadly accepted criterion for what probability of 
risk constitutes the level of "serious danger" that should trigger a 
protective response. As established by the California Supreme Court, 
the Tarasoff rule requires a therapist to recognize an apparently 
quantifiable entity-"a serious danger of violence"-when the requisite 
quantity cannot be specified. The impossibility of rationally 
implementing the Tarasoff obligation suggests something basically 
wrong with the major premise the California Supreme Court formulated 
so that Poddar's therapists might be found negligent. 
170. John Monahan & Eric Silver, Judicial Decision Thresholds for Violence Risk Management, 2 
INT'L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 1,4 (2003). In Figure 4,1% and 56% probabilities of violence 
correspond to scores of26 and 74 respectively. The computation of these results appears in Appendix II 
of this Article. 
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VI. A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE 
A. Problems with Predicting Consequences 
Whether or not one thinks that Prosenjit Poddar's psychologist did the 
right thing when he called the police, the statement that Poddar made 
concerning his intent to kill Tatiana Tarasoff does strike me-and I 
think would strike most mental health professionals-as an event that 
should have led a clinician to at least consider taking some action 
beyond simply continuing outpatient therapy sessions. Yet, as Tarasoff 
and subsequent cases have framed the matter, a psychotherapist's 
undertaking a potentially protective response to a patient's possible 
future violence becomes a matter of trade-offs, in which, for obscure 
"policy" reasons, the value of protecting the public is paramount. What 
the patient loses-be it confidentiality (if the therapist issues a warning) 
or freedom (if the therapist initiates hospitalization)-is justified by 
balancing the consequences for the patient of taking action against the 
consequences for society of failing to do so. What is good for the 
individual must be sacrificed for the (greater) good of society. 
I have stated this result baldly, perhaps tendentiously, but nonetheless 
(I think) fairly to highlight what should be a source of ethical discomfort 
about the characterization of ethical decision-making that we find in 
Tarasoff. In traditional medical ethics, doctors serve individual patients 
and have fiduciary obligations to them, not to those around them. Yet 
the medical literature affords repeated examples that consider 
physicians' clinical decisions in light of the broader social implications 
of those decisions, such that doctors are urged to make choices different 
from ones that they would be dictated by considering only the welfare of 
an individual patient. 17I In such cases, it seems, ethical principles are in 
conflict with each other, and the problem facing doctors therefore is to 
achieve some sort of resolution among the conflicting principles. 
171. For example, "Although antibiotics have little or no benefit for colds, upper respiratory tract 
infections, or bronchitis, these conditions account for a sizable proportion of total antibiotic 
prescriptions for adults by office-based physicians in the United States." R. Gonzales et aI., Antibiotic 
Prescribing for Adults with Colds, Upper Respiratory Tract Infections, and Bronchitis by Ambulatory 
Care Physicians, 278 JAMA 901, 901 (1997). The needless prescription of an antibiotic may not harm 
the individual who receives the drug (and may placate a patient's desire to get something tangible from 
an office visit), but the widespread practice of unnecessarily distributing antibiotics conduces to the 
evolution of drug-resistant organisms. Richard Colgan & John H. Powers, Appropriate Antimicrobial 
Prescribing: Approaches That Limit Antibiotic Resistance, 64 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 999 (2001). For 
this reason, physicians have called upon their colleagues to desist from this practice. B. Schwartz et aI., 
Preventing the Emergence of Antimicrobial Resistance. A Call for Action by Clinicians, Public Health 
Officials, and Patients, 278 JAMA 944 (1997). 
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The presence of such apparent conflicts is exemplified by the 
Preamble of American Medical Association's Principles of Medical 
Ethics, which tells doctors that their "profession has long subscribed to a 
body of ethical statements developed primarily for the benefit of the 
patient. As a member of this profession, a physician must recognize 
responsibility to patients first and foremost, as well as to society .... ,,172 
Elsewhere in the Principles, the physician is told that "while caring for a 
patient," the physician must "regard responsibility to the patient as 
paramount.,,173 Yet the same Principles also advise the physician to 
"respect the law and. . .seek changes in those requirements which are 
contrary to the best interests of the patient" 174 and to "safeguard patient 
confidences and privacy," though only "within the constraints of the 
law.,,175 
Such statements reflect the problems inherent in attempting to create 
guidelines for ethical choice absent an overall theory that provides the 
background for resolving or reconceptualizing conflicts between rules 
that customarily inform conduct. In a series of writings,176 I have 
suggested that Kant's theoretical approach has much to offer 
psychiatrists (and implicitly, other mental health professionals) in 
contexts where their duties to patients seem to conflict with the 
expectations or demands of society. Kant's theories have especial 
appeal in the current context because they express eschew 
consequentialism, that is, the view that normative pronouncements 
172. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIA nON'S PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS [hereinafter AMA 
ETHICS], http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html(last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
173. /d. at Principle VIII. 
174. Id. Principle III. 
175. Id. at Principle IV. An earlier version of this Principle is cited in TarasofJlI, 551 P.2d 334, 
347 (Cal. 1976). In December 1983, following TarasofJ and subsequent related decisions, AMA's 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs developed an ethics policy to address psychiatrists' new, legally 
imposed obligations: 
The obligation to safeguard patient confidences is subject to certain exceptions which are 
ethically and legally justified because of overriding social considerations. Where a patient 
threatens to inflict serious bodily hann to another person or to him or herself and there is 
a reasonable probability that the patient may carry out the threat, the physician should 
take reasonable precautions for the protection of the intended victim, including 
notification of law enforcement authorities. 
AMA Code of Medical Ethics Opinion E-5.05, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8353.html 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
176. Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency: Fording Murky Ethical 
Waters, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. I, 53-88 (1992); Douglas Mossman, Is Forensic Testimony 
Fundamentally Immoral?, 17 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 347,357-68 (1994); Douglas Mossman, Is 
Prosecution "Medically Appropriate""? 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 15,60-78 
(2005) [hereinafter Mossman, Medically Appropriate]. 
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should reflect calculations about future consequences. l77 Having just 
shown, in previous sections, the futility of making decisions based on 
calculations about the consequences of violence predictions, I now. 
address how a Kantian approach to the facts in Tarasoff can lead to a 
superior lesson from the case and a more practicable legal rule. 
B. Kant's Approach to Ethics 
1. Two Formulations of the "Categorical Imperative" 
Kant's ethical theory is premised on (among other things) the idea 
that morality addresses itself to rational beings. This makes moral 
obligation something that sensible people cannot avoid considering, 
because we cannot rationally claim that we are not rational beings. If, 
then, we discover some fundamental law or rule that prescribes what a 
rational agent must do under certain circumstances, we have come upon 
a duty that we cannot logically avoid. Acting out of moral duty 
constrains us to follow this fundamental law, which describes how any 
rational creature should act. We cannot ignore or avoid this duty; 
because of its universal content, it retains its validity under all possible 
circumstances, and is therefore "categorical."l78 
This leads to Kant's first formulation of his "categorical imperative," 
which tells each person, "Act only on that maxim through which you 
can at the same time will that it should become a universallaw.,,179 On 
this formulation, "the moral worth of an action does not depend on the 
result expected from it," says Kant; "nothing but the idea of the law 
itself ... can constitute that pre-eminent good which we call moral, a 
good which is already present in the person acting on this idea and has 
not to be awaited merely from the result.,,180 
For example, suppose I wish to find out whether it is permissible to 
promise deceitfully. The categorical imperative directs me to consider 
not whether it might be prudent to do so (which would involve an 
inquiry about the expected short- and long-term gains and losses from 
breaking a promise), but whether such conduct could be right. To find 
this out, I need to ask whether it could be a universal law that everyone 
177. For a nice explanation of consequentialist moral theories (and their limitations), see WaIter 
Sinnott-Annstrong, Consequentialism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. ZaIta, 
ed., Summer 2003), available at http://plato.stanford.eduJentries/consequentialism/; for a defense, see 
Walter Sinnott-Annstrong, An Argument/or Consequentialism, 6 ETHICS 399 (\992). 
178. OMS, supra note 27, at 87-88 [420-21). 
179. ld. at 88 [421). 
180. ld. at 69 [401]. 
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might make a false promise when one could not otherwise extricate 
oneself from some difficult situation. Simply stating this allows me to 
see that lying could not be a universal law of conduct: if lying were 
universal, "there could properly [speaking] be no promises at all," 
because no one would believe anyone else's promise. "[C]onsequently 
my maxim, as soon as it was made a universal law, would be bound to 
annul itself."lsl 
An important point, for our present purposes, is that I do not have to 
be able to predict the future (or, to use Kant's phrase, "I need no far-
reading ingenuity"ls2) to discover what I must do to behave morally. 
Though I cannot know and am "incapable of being prepared for all the 
chances that happen in [the world], I ask myself only: 'Can you also will 
that your maxim should become a universal law?' Where you cannot, it 
is to be rejected, ... not because of a prospective loss to you or even to 
others, but because it cannot fit as a principle into a possible enactment 
ofuniversallaw."ls3 
The preceding paragraphs' concern motives for action that can 
address themselves only to rational beings, because only rational beings 
can attempt to guide themselves in conformity to laws. If I regard 
myself as a rational being guided by laws, I must also regard other 
rational beings as equal, in this respect, to myself. When I attempt to 
guide myself by categorical imperatives, my will directs itself to an end 
that has noncontingent, absolute worth-an end, that is, in itself. But 
now I have discovered "something whose existence has in itself an 
absolute value, something which as an end in itself could be a ground of 
determinate laws."IS4 If! recognize my own rational nature as an end in 
itself, I must also acknowledge that "every other rational being 
conceives his existence"IS5 similarly, which yields "an objective 
principle, from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible 
to derive all laws for the will."ls6 
Realizing this allows Kant to conclude that, as a practical matter, the 
first formulation of the categorical imperative is equivalent to the 
following rule: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply 
as a means, but always at the same time as an end."IS7 Returning to the 
lSI. Id. at 71 [403]. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 95 [428]. 
185. Id. at 96 [429]. 
186. /d. at 96 [428-29]. 
187. /d. at 96 [429]. 
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example of the deceitful promise, we gain from this second formulation 
an additional understanding of why such an act is wrong. Kant says that 
someone who contemplates deceiving someone else should "see at once 
that he is intending to make use of another man merely as a means,,188 
without regarding the other as an end in himself, "[f]or the man whom I 
seek to use for my own purposes by such a promise cannot possibly 
agree with my way of behaving tor ward] him, and so cannot himself 
share the end of the action.,,189 
2. An Aside 
Although this derivation of moral principles is abstruse, a key force 
behind the attractiveness of these two principles is their agreement with 
some of our everyday intuitions about moral thinking. Universalization, 
for example, underlies the homely question, "How would you feel if 
someone did that to you?" that we use to get people to think about their 
behavior less selfishly. 
Kant pointedly states, however, that the categorical imperative is not 
the same as the command, "That which you would not want done to you, 
do not do unto others." The latter is only a consequence of the former. 
Also, the latter does not provide a basis for duties to oneself, for duties 
to treat others benevolently (because many people might consent to be 
left alone in order to be excused from being good to others), or for the 
justness of criminal punishments (against which the criminal might 
argue to the judge who would sentence him).190 My point here is only 
that Kant's ideas accord with how we really make moral arguments to 
each other. Kant makes a similar point in the Critique of Practical 
Reason: 
Ask yourself whether, if the action which you propose should take place 
by a law of a nature of which you yourself were a part, you could regard 
it as possible through your will. Everyone does, in fact, decide by this 
rule whether actions are morally good or bad .... If the maxim of action 
is not so constituted as to stand the test of being made the form of a 
natural law in general, it is morally impossible. Even common sense 
judges in this way, for its most ordinary ~udgments, even those of 
experience, are always based on naturallaw. 19 
188. [d. at 97 [429]. 
189. /d. 
190. [d. 
191. KpR, supra note 27, at 72-73 [69]. 
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Treating all rational beings as ends in themselves, and not as means to 
some other end, is what lies behind our notion that morality requires us 
to restrict criminal punishment only to those who are guilty. That this 
must be an absolute bound on conduct accounts for our intuitive grasp of 
Abraham's argument against destroying Sodom and Gomorrah in their 
entirety if those cities contained righteous men. Abraham's challenge to 
G-d-"It would be sacrilege to You to do such a thing as this, to kill the 
righteous with the wicked, and have the righteous and the wicked fare 
alike. It would be sacrilege to You! Shall the Judge of the whole world 
not do justice?"I92-rests upon "the audacious claim,,193 that even the 
Almighty's acts must be judged against a moral standard that does not 
tolerate the death of some humans as a means for attaining some larger 
goal. 
3. Conclusions from the Categorical Imperative 
The universalization and end-in-itself formulations of the categorical 
imperative have direct behavioral implications, says Kant, for our 
development as human beings and for out treatment of each other. First, 
these principles tell us that we have a duty to develop our natural talents. 
It is true that a world could exist in which we were lazy and content with 
how we are. But we could not will this course of conduct as a universal 
law of nature: as rational beings, we must realize and will that our 
talents be developed, because our talents are useful to us. Moreover, to 
neglect our talents, though possibly consistent with the "maintenance" 
of humanity as an end in itself, is not consistent with the "promotion" of 
our humanity. 194 
Second, these formulations tell us that we have a duty to care about 
the welfare of others and to promote their improvement. True, we can 
conceive of a world in which no one cared about or helped others, but 
we cannot will that ignoring the needs of others should be a universal 
practice. Such a maxim must contradict itself, for there are many times 
in which we would need and want aid, love, or sympathy from others, 
but our universalization of not caring about others would deprive us of 
any reason to hope of obtaining those things from anyone. Also, if our 
regard for others as ends in themselves is to receive its full meaning and 
have its full effect on us, then we must see the promotion of others' 
192. Genesis 18:25 (my translation). 
193. RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY, ETZ HAYIM: TORAH AND COMMENTARY 103 (200 I). 
194. GMS, supra note 27, at 97-98 [430]. 
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faculties as the realization of their being treated as ends. 195 
4. Two Other Fonnulations l96 
Kant offers a third (in his mind, inter-derivable) fonnulation of the 
categorical imperative, one that Kant summarizes as the principle of 
autonomy.197 When one wills from duty, one renounces self-interest and 
regards oneself as the source of a universal legislative will, rejecting 
maxims that are inconsistent with this posture. Applied to everyone, we 
obtain the"Idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes 
universal law,,,198 which is a candidate for a categorical imperative 
because it is not based on self-interest and can therefore be universal. 
This fonnulation focuses on our status as law-giving actors and is 
therefore a source of dignity. We renounce selfish motives and are 
guided by those principles that express our independence from self-
interest. We strive, that is, to adhere to those principles that express the 
autonomy of a rational will, one that can be the source of universal laws 
and can obligate itself through them. 199 Our autonomy, dignity, and 
intrinsic value as human beings inheres in our being rational agents who 
can create and use binding moral laws as guides for conduct. 200 
This leads to Kant's fourth fonnulation of the categorical imperative, 
which envisions rational beings united in their commitment to "[a Jct on 
the maxims of a member who makes universal laws for a merely 
possible kingdom of ends.,,201 That is, we confonn our actions to 
maxims laid down by a legislator of universal laws that could bind all 
rational wills, including his own; at the same time, we see everyone as a 
legislator who must be treated as an end in himself. In other words, we 
recognize that we have a fundamental obligation to act on principles that 
would be acceptable to a community of rational agents, each of whom 
had an equal share in creating the laws that governed the community.202 
195. [d. at 98 [430]. 
196. Kant believed his four formulations of the categorical imperative were equivalent, at least 
practically-they allied to the same results as guides for conduct. For a good discussion of this issue, 
and a useful summary of Kant's moral philosophy, see Robert Johnson, Kant's Moral Philosophy, in 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed., Spring 2004), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edulentries/kant-moral/. 
197. GMS,supranote27,at 100[433]. 
198. [d. at 98 [431]. 
199. [d. at 99-100 [431-33]. 
200. [d. at 102-03 [435-36]. 
201. [d. at 106 [438-39]. 
202. [d. at 101 [433-34]. 
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C. Implications of Kant's Ethical Philosophy 
If we adopt Kant's principles as valid ethical constraints for Poddar's 
clinicians, then any action required of clinicians by a tort rule must 
recognize that those clinicians operate under those ethical constraints 
when they choose how to respond to Poddar. Those constraints include 
the notion, first, that the response required of clinicians must be 
"universalizable"; that is, the response must apply to all situations such 
as the one that arose in August 1969, when Poddar made known his 
intent to kill Tatiana. The required response of clinicians should not 
depend on any ability to predict violence, but should be based on the 
information they have at hand. The clinicians must respond to what 
Poddar has done, not to what he might do. 
Second, whatever practice the law would require of clinicians must 
allow them to treat Poddar as an end in himself. The required practice 
should not use him merely as a means to achieve some social goal 
(however attractive that goal may seem). Third, any required practice 
must respect Poddar's rationality. This is not meant as a comment on 
whether each (or any) of Poddar's plans or wishes actually are rational. 
Rather, the clinicians' response to Poddar must respect his humanity and 
his logical aspiration, as a reasoning being and member of the kingdom 
of ends, to act rationally in accordance with motives that his fellow 
rational creatures could adopt. 
VII. A REVISION OF THE TARASOFF RULE 
A. Review 
In Section II.B., I posited that after looking at the facts leading to 
Tatiana Tarasoff's death, the majority of judges hearing the Tarasoff 
case drew the conclusion that Poddar's actions merited some response 
by his clinicians beyond simply continuing his psychotherapy. I then 
characterized the court's job as construing a major premise such that, 
taking the facts of the case as a minor premise, liability on the part of 
Poddar's clinicians (and other clinicians in similar circumstances) was a 
logical conclusion. The general form of this major premise was: 
• If a patient does A and the therapist does not do B and the patient 
later harms C, the therapist will be liable for the harm to C. 
Filled in by the Tarasoff court, that major premise became: 
• If a patient displays behavior that a therapist should recognize as 
indicating that the patient presents a serious danger of violence, and 
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if the therapist does not both (I) apply the standards of the 
therapist's profession to determine that the patient presents a 
serious danger of violence and (2) use reasonable care to protect the 
intended victim from the danger, and if the patient later harms C, 
then the therapist will be liable for the harm to C. 
As previous sections have explained, this major premise permitted 
post-Tarasoff courts to expand the duty to protect well beyond those 
clinical junctures in which patients made threats about specific people 
whom they intended to harm, to encompass any clinical encounter in 
which a patient might pose a "serious risk" of harming anyone who 
might conceivably cross his path. As we have also seen, application of 
this major premise, in the context of the imperfect ability of clinicians to 
distinguish persons who will not do violence from those who will, 
necessarily requires clinicians to confine (or otherwise restrict the 
freedom of) patients who may not have threatened anyone and who have 
not yet done anything harmful, simply because they pose a risk of doing 
so. The level of probability that should trigger this protective action 
cannot be defined, however. Moreover, by countenancing needless 
confinement as a statistical consequence of clinicians' imperfect 
predictions, this legal scheme explicitly treats nonviolent patients' loss 
of freedom as a means toward the end of protecting other members of 
society. 
Is it possible to construct a major premise that, given a situation like 
the one that Poddar's statements created, would hold a therapist to some 
responsibility to act protectively without treating psychiatric patients as 
mere objects whose freedom can be disregarded if doing so will further 
society's interests? In fact, the job of creating such a premise has been 
accomplished in the form of legislation that more than twenty state 
legislatures have enacted?03 Often, this legislation has responded to 
concerns of mental health professionals who, faced with the expanding 
and uncertain prospects of court-imposed liability for patients' violent 
acts, sought help from state legislatures to provide "well-defined 
limitations of their protective duties. ,,204 
203. Claudia Kachigian & Alan R. Felthous, Court Responses to Tarasoff Statutes, 32 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 263, 264 (2004) (at the publication date, "23 such statutes pertaining to 
psychiatrists have been enacted."). 
204. fd. at 272. "The creation of such a duty to protect has aroused much controversy because 
of ... ambiguity about what actions the clinician must undertake to discharge the duty. To clarify 
clinicians' responsibilities, many states have enacted laws that limit therapists' potential liability if they 
take specified actions when a patient makes a serious threat against an identifiable victim." Dale E. 
McNeil et aI., Management of Threats of Violence Under California's Duty-to-Protect Statute, 155 AM. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 1097, 1097 (1998) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Jenks v. Brown, 557 N.W.2d 114, 116 
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B. Ohio's Major Premise 
An example of such a major premise is the 1999 statute enacted in 
Ohio in response to the state's first clear duty-to-protect decision, 
Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Center?05 The 
decision arose from a lawsuit brought against a mental health center and 
its professionals following a July 1991 episode in which Matt Morgan 
shot his parents to death and wounded his sister. Morgan was charged 
with murder, but a jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity.206 
Morgan had experienced mental problems for a few years and had taken 
antipsychotic drugs in Philadelphia before returning to Ohio with 
instructions to continue care. A psychiatrist treating Morgan at the 
Fairfield Family Counseling Center (Fairfield) stopped Morgan's 
medication. When Morgan's condition deteriorated months later, other 
clinicians decided they could not force medication or hospitalization 
upon him. 
A 4-3 majority of the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the plaintiffs 
had valid grounds to sue. Relying (as it in had several other duty-to-
protect decisions) on Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 315 and 319, the 
court found that a "special relationship" exists between a 
psychotherapist and a patient, such that the therapist has "a duty to 
exercise his or her best professional judgment to prevent such harm from 
occurring. ,,207 
The Morgan majority expressly assigned mental health care the social 
role of controlling violence through treatment, especially medication. 
The court reasoned that antipsychotic "medication controls symptoms of 
schizophrenia in approximately seventy percent of schizophrenics," that 
while taking medication Morgan had been "a medication-
controlled ... patient," and that if Morgan had continued to take 
"medication, he would not have had the overt psychotic symptoms that 
led him to kill his parents and injure his sister.,,208 Also, the clinicians at 
Fairfield had the power to initiate civil commitment procedures. 
"Thus," said the Morgan majority, "we conclude that the 
psychotherapist-outpatient relationship embodies sufficient elements of 
(1996) (commenting on the legislative history of Michigan's statute: U[e]nacted in 1989, the duty to 
warn statute was created to limit the liability of mental health practitioners."). 
205. 673 N.E.2d 1311 (Ohio 1997). 
206. For a fuller description of Matt Morgan's background and current living situation, see 
Encarnacion Pyle, In Shadow of Tragedy, Normal Life Takes Root: Man Who Killed Parents Optimistic 
Despite Illness, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 27, 2005, at AI. 
207. Morgan, 673 N.E.2d at 1328-1329. 
208. Id. at 1323-1324. 
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control to warrant a corresponding duty to control.,,209 Moreover, said 
the Morgan court: 
Society has a strong interest in protecting itself from those mentally ill 
patients who pose a substantial risk of hann. (citation omitted). To this 
end, society looks to the mental health profession to play a significant 
role in identifying and containing such risks. (citation omitted). The 
mental health community, therefore, has a broadly based responsibilin; to 
protect the community against danger associated with mental illness?1 
Ohio mental health professionals responded to Morgan just as had 
clinicians in other states where courts had imposed duties to protect the 
public-by appealing to the state's legislature for a more reasonable rule 
about when liability could be imposed. The result was a 1999 statute 
passed expressly to supercede Morgan,211 with provisions similar to a 
model statute proposed in the late 1980s by the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA).212 As a result, an Ohio mental health professional 
may be held liable for harm done by his patient to a third party, but only 
if the "patient or a knowledgeable person has communicated to the 
professional ... an explicit threat of inflicting imminent and serious 
physical harm to or causing the death of one or more clearly identifiable 
potential victims, [and] the professional ... has reason to believe that 
the ... patient has the intent and ability to carry out the threat.,,213 If 
such a threat is made, taking one of several actions-arranging for the 
emergency, voluntary, or involuntary hospitalization of the patient; 
establish and undertake a form of treatment that is calculated to 
eliminate the risk of violence; or warning the police and the potential 
target of violence-immunizes the clinician from liability.214 Ohio's 
law directs that the clinician, in selecting a course of action, pick an 
alternative that, while eliminating the danger, "would least abridge the 
209. !d. at 1324. 
210. Jd. at 1324 (citations omitted). I am not sure whether this assertion is more insulting to 
mental health professionals or to the patients whom we treat. As I have observed elsewhere, "I had 
entered psychiatry to help patients become more autonomous and to fulfill their human potential. In 
Morgan, however, Ohio's supreme court said my job was to contain risks posed by dangerous people 
whose willful acts would otherwise spread like deadly germs." Here was (to use Phil Resnick's phrase) 
"the zoo-keeper theory of psychiatry" officially endorsed in a legal opinion. Mossman, Rabbi's Sermon, 
supra note28, at 362. 
211. OHIO REv. CODE § 2305.51 (West 1999). Ohio House 8i11 71 also reworded portions of 
OHIO REv. CODE § 5122.34. Michigan is one of several states with an equivalent law, although it is 
organized differently and worded much more clearly. See MICH. COMPo LAWS § 330.1946 (West 2006). 
212. See Appelbaum et aI., supra note 14, at 827-28. 
213. OHIO REv. CODE § 2305.51(8) (West 2006). 
214. Jd. 
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rights" of the patient. 215 
In the analytical framework used in this Article, the "major premise" 
created by the Ohio statute is 
• If a patient or a knowledgeable person communicates to a mental 
health professional an explicit threat to do serious physical harm to 
one or more clearly identifiable potential victims, and if the 
professional has reason to believe that the patient intends and has 
the ability to carry out the threat, and if the therapist does not take a 
specified action-arrange for hospitalization of the patient, 
effectuate a treatment plan calculated to eliminate the risk of 
violence, or warn both the police and the potential victim-,and if 
the patient later harms C, then the therapist may be liable for the 
harm to C. 
Let us now return to the problem faced by the majority in Tarasoff, 
who, viewing the facts presented by the plaintiffs, felt that the 
appropriate response was to construct a rule under which the defendants 
would have answer in tort. Does the just-articulated major premise, 
coupled with the facts in Poddar's treatment, lead to the conclusion that 
Poddar's clinicians could be liable for Tatiana's death? It certainly does. 
Poddar uttered a specific threat with a specific target, and his 
psychologist apparently believed Poddar could and intended to act upon 
his threat. The psychologist, in consultation with other clinicians, 
attempted to arrange hospitalization but did not do so effectively; the 
clinicians did not alter Poddar's treatment to address his homicidal 
thoughts (and may actually have compromised his treatment); the 
clinicians alerted the police but not Tatiana. 
C. Is Ohio's Duty to Protect Acceptable? 
1. Fairness to Mental Health Professionals 
Ohio's statutory response to Morgan would thus satisfy the Tarasoff 
majority's needs for a liability-creating major premise as well as did the 
rule that the majority actually articulated. But is the Ohio statutory rule 
any better than the Tarasoffrule? For selfish reasons, almost all mental 
health professionals would probably prefer Ohio's rule because it clearly 
demarcates those events that create a duty to act protectively and what a 
mental health professional must do to fulfill the duty. Mental health 
professionals also might argue that the Ohio rule is objectively fairer to 
215. OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.51 (C)(2) (West 2006). 
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them. After all, among the reasons that traditional Anglo-American 
common law "has persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral 
obligation of common humanity to go to the aid of another human being 
who is in danger," are "the difficulties of setting any standards of 
unselfish service to fellow men .... ,,216 Yet duties to protect or rescue 
others exist in Jewish religious law,217 French criminallaw,218 and laws 
in some u.s. states,219 which place limited legal requirements on 
individuals to provide assistance to others facing danger, requirements 
that accord with our moral sense of what "common humanity" requires. 
Mental health professionals might with some justification argue that 
assigning them a protective obligation to intervene is fair if they are 
given clear boundaries on when the legal duty would apply and clear 
instructions on what actions discharge the duty.220 
216. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 56 at 375-76 (5th 
ed. 1984). The latter quote appears in Tarasoffll, 551 P.2d 334, 343 n. 5. (Cal. 1976). 
217. See Leviticus 19: 16, which contains the Hebrew commandment "10 ta 'amod ai-dam 
rei 'echa." These words literally say, "[ d]o not stand on the blood of your neighbor," but their meaning is 
better captured in the Jewish Publication Society's 1917 translation, "neither shalt thou stand idly by the 
blood of thy neighbor." Leviticus 19:16 (Jewish Pub. Soc. 1917). I provide a more detailed discussion 
of this commandment in the context of the Tarasoffobligation in Rabbi's Sermon, supra note 28, at 362. 
218. See C. PEN, ART. 223-6: 
Quiconque pouvant empecher par son action immediate, sans risque pour lui ou pour 
les tiers, soit un crime, soit un delit contre I'integrite corporel/e de la personne s 'abstient 
volontairement de Ie faire est puni de cinq ans d'emprisonnement et de 500 000 F 
d'amende. (Anyone who, being able to prevent by his immediate action, without risk to 
himself or to third parties, a felony or a misdemeanor against the bodily integrity of a 
person, wilfully abstains from doing so, is punished by five years' imprisonment and a 
fine of 500,000 francs [$75,000].) 
Sera puni des memes peines quiconque s 'abstient volontairement de porter a un 
personne en peril I 'assistance que, sans risque pour lui ou pour les tiers, iI pouvait lui 
prerer soit par son action personnel/e, soit en provoquant un secours. ("The same 
penalties apply to anyone who wilfully abstains from rendering help to a person in danger 
that he could render, without risk to himself or to third parties, either by his personal 
action or by initiating rescue operations. "). 
/d., available at http://admi.neticode/index-CPENALLL.html (my translation). The history of this 
obligation in French criminal law is reviewed in Peter M. Agulnick & Heidi V. Rivkin, Criminal 
Liability for Failure to Rescue: A Brief Survey of French and American Law, 8 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 
93,106-110 (1998). 
219. VT. ST. ANN., tit. 12 § 519 (a)(2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 
(2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.027 (2006). 
220. Over two decades ago, Dr. Appelbaum observed, with his customary sagacity: 
Even before the original Tarasoff decision, therapists often felt a responsibility to protect 
potential victims of their patients and acted in that regard. It is, indeed, difficult to 
formulate a moral argument against the position that therapists should act to protect those 
whom they believe to be endangered, as should all human beings. Recent data suggest 
that the majority of therapists would support this position. The overlay of legal liability 
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A key feature of Ohio's duty-to-protect statute IS that the 
circumstances that trigger the duty do not involve predictions of 
violence or calculations of whether the probability of violence has 
reached some threshold level. Instead, mental health professionals need 
only to take the threats of patients seriously, and to decide, using their 
common sense, whether their patients can and really intend to carry out 
those threats. Under such circumstances, the statute in effect tells the 
professional, "The law expects you to try to intervene somehow, just 
like anyone should." The statute expects mental health professionals to 
consider actions-arranging for hospitalization or changing treatment 
plans-that ordinary citizens cannot do. Yet these special capacities and 
the requirement to consider them have parallels in other legally 
bestowed powers or responsibilities exercised by other citizens, 
including school officials, school crossing guards, lifeguards, fire-
fighters, and police. The Ohio statute recognizes the special status of 
mental health professionals but does not single them out unfairly. 
2. The Kantian Perspective 
As previous sections have shown, the protective duty enunciated in 
Tarasoff leads to two objectionable results: impracticability and less-
than-full regard for the humanity of psychiatric patients. Ohio's duty-to-
protect statute solves the impracticability problem by referring to known 
events rather than predictions, probabilities, and undefinable thresholds. 
But does Ohio's statute address the moral problems described in Section 
VI?Judged from a Kantian perspective, how does Ohio's statute measure 
up? 
a. The Patient as Human Actor 
On initial inspection, the Ohio statute has the clear moral advantage 
of treating the patient as a human being, capable of rationally carrying 
out goals for potentially rational ends. In looking to a patient's threats 
as the trigger for action, the Ohio duty-to-protect statute treats the 
patient as a planners and initiators of actions undertaken for reasons. 
has served to distort this moral core of the Tarasoffdoctrine. Further, the requirement that 
therapists protect victims not only when they know of potential dangerousness but when, 
according to professional standards, they should know of it is probably too stringent, 
given the limits of current abilities to predict dangerousness and the absence of 
professional standards for this task. 
Paul S. Appelbaum, Tarasoff and the Clinician: Problems in FUlfilling the Duly to Protect, 142 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 425, 429 ( 1985) (citations omitted). 
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The statute directs mental health professionals to attend to a patient's 
expressed intent as an indicator of what the patient will do, rather than to 
regard the patient as a statistical source of future harm, the probability of 
which the professional must estimate. Though it is not the job of mental 
health professionals (qua mental health professionals) to provide moral 
evaluations of their patients, the Ohio statute lets professionals regard 
their patients as actors who think, make choices, and may perform stupid 
or blameworthy actions-the only attitude that is consistent with 
regarding patients as human, moral agents. 
b. The Problem of Coercion 
A problem arises, however, when we put portions of Ohio's statute to 
the tests of morality specified in Kant's ethics. Directing professionals 
to make changes in a treatment plan seems fully consistent with what 
Kant would require. Although the word "psychiatrist" did not exist 
when Kant was alive, Kant knew that people could be irrational and 
make bad judgments, and suggests that a form of self-administered 
cognitive therapy is essential: 
Reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism; should it 
limit freedom of criticism by any prohibitions, it must harm itself, 
drawing upon itself a damaging suspicion. Nothing is so important 
through its usefulness, nothing so sacred, that it may be exem~ted from 
this searching examination, which knows no respect for persons. 21 
At the same time, Kant construed the obligation to respect others' 
humanity as placing limits on how we may respond to others' ill-advised 
plans. We may not treat another person as though he were not capable 
of using reason to control of himself. "Even in a case where someone 
evidently is wrong or mistaken," writes Christine Korsgaard, Kant 
believed that "we ought to suppose he must have what he takes to be 
good reasons for what he believes or what he does .... [T]his attitude is 
something that we owe to him, something that is his right. ,,222 In 
responding to someone's "errors," states Kant, we should not call them 
"absurdities, poor judgment, and so forth, but rather [should] suppose 
that his judgment must yet contain some truth and to seek this out" while 
at the same time "explaining to him the possibility of his having erred, to 
preserve his respect for his own understanding.,,223 While Kant may 
221. KrV, supra note 27, at 596 [A 739/8767]. 
222. Chiristine M. Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil, 15 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 
325, 335 (1986). 
223. MS, supra note 27, at 210 [463]. 
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encourage self-examination and self-improvement, what we can 
legitimately require of others is limited by the obligation to address them 
as rational beings and ends in themselves. "Reason depends on this 
freedom for its very existence," states Kant. "For reason has no 
dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement of free 
citizens, of whom each one must be permitted to express, without let or 
hindrance, his objections or even his veto.,,224 
We therefore may reasonably take Kant to say that, if I know 
someone is about to do something wrong, I may try to convince him to 
do otherwise, perhaps through argument or (as his psychiatrist) 
psychotherapy. But Kant also says I may not do things to subvert his 
rational choice, even if I believe doings these things will thwart his plans 
to carry out his evil intent. 
In the most (in)famous example of this tenet, Kant insists that it 
would be wrong to lie to a would-be murderer who comes to my door 
and asks whether the intended victim, my friend whom I am sheltering 
within, is in the house. Some of Kant's reasons for this seem contrived, 
wrong, and consequentialist. He states, for example, that if I answered 
"no," but was unaware that my friend was leaving my home, so that my 
lie resulted in the killer's finding my friend when he otherwise would 
not have, I am responsible for the consequences; whereas if I had merely 
told the truth as I knew it, perhaps the neighbors would have come and 
apprehended the killer. 225 But Kant's more Kantian reason is that the 
duty to tell the truth "makes no distinction between persons toward 
whom we have this duty, and toward whom we may be free from it; but 
it is an unconditional duty which holds in all circumstances.,,226 Telling 
the truth to a would-be murderer may well become one link in a chain of 
events in which harm occurs, but only "accidentally.,,227 Lying, 
however, is always wrong, because when I lie I am thereby attempting to 
manipulate another human being for my own purpose-in the case of 
Kant's murderer-at-the-door example, the purpose of saving my friend. 
Because the murderer cannot possibly agree to be lied to, he "cannot 
himself share [in] the end of the action.,,228 
224. KrV, supra note 27, at 595 [A7391B767]. 
225. SRTL, supra note 27, at 362-63. 
226. [d. at 364. 
227. [d. at 365. Kant's point here is that hann to my friend is a kind of casualty of my truth-
telling, rather than the direct result ofa wrongful action. SRTL, supra note 27, at 364. 
228. GMS, supra note 27, at 97 [429]. Kant goes on to state, 
This incompatibility with the principle of duty to others leaps to the eye more obviously 
when we bring in examples of attempts on the freedom and property of others. For then it 
is manifest that a violator of the rights of man intends to use the person of others merely 
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Kant's position thus seems to preclude issuing a warning to a 
potential victim over a potentially violent patient's objection, because 
doing so might involve breaking a promise (implicit or explicit) not to 
breach therapeutic confidentiality, and because the goal (the end) of the 
warning would not be an end shared by the patient. Even if the patient 
grudgingly acquiesced to the warning, the goal of the warning is still to 
interfere with the patient's desire, and thus is something to which he 
cannot logically give his assent. The same problems would apply, a 
fortiori, to warnings given to police (who would presumably act to 
interfere with the patient's intent) and to overt restrictions on freedom 
carried out through involuntary hospitalization. 
c. Coercive Punishment 229 
Kant recognized, though, that society needs coercive punishments as 
a condition of freedom. It therefore is instructive to look to how he 
solves this analogous problem-the moral acceptability of punishment 
in criminal law-for some clues about when other coercive social 
practices might be tolerable. Kant's moral position requires him to 
justify criminal sanctions within a framework that centralizes the 
humanity of the criminal himself, that is, to show how political coercion 
can be justified within a moral context that requires individuals always 
to be treated as ends in themselves. Kant accomplishes this through 
application of his critical technique, arriving at a "transcendental 
deduction" of a regulative idea of reason. A regulative idea is a 
necessary goal of reason's efforts to organize experience230 into a 
"systematic unity.,,23l Ideas that allow reason to arrive at a "systematic 
as a means without taking into consideration that, as rational beings, they ought always at 
the same time to be rated as ends-that is, only as beings who must themselves be able to 
share in the end of the very same action. 
!d. at 97 (430). 
229. This section is adapted from Mossman, Medically Appropriate, supra note 176, at 65-72. 
230. John Ladd, Translator's Introduction to KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 
xviii (New York, Macmillan 1965). 
231. In the CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, Kant explains that "transcendental" knowledge refers to 
knowledge "by which we know that-and how-certain representations (intuitions or concepts) can be 
employed or are possible purely a priori. KrV supra note 27, at 96 [A56=B80], The term 
'transcendental,' that is to say, signifies such knowledge as concerns the a priori possibility of 
knowledge, or its a priori employment." Id. at 96 [A56=B80). The "transcendental deduction of all 
ideas of. .. reason" involves showing that these ideas are "rules of the empirical employment of reason 
[that] lead us to a systematic unity, under the presupposition of such an object in the idea; and that they 
thus contribute to the extension of empirical knowledge, without ever being in a position to run counter 
to it." Id. From such a deduction, we conclude that reason must "proceed always in accordance with 
such ideas." !d. at 550 [A671=B699). 
HeinOnline -- 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 595 2006-2007
2006] KANT MEETS TARAS OFF 595 
unity" and achieve coherence are necessary rules that must govern the 
area of reason under consideration?32 
The law is concerned with the effect that one person's choices and 
ensuing actions have on others. Because laws apply to everyone 
equally, they must be consonant with the freedom-maximizing 
"Universal Principle of Justice," which requires that "my action or my 
condition in general can coexist with the freedom of everyone in 
accordance with a universal law.,,233 My having a right to act freely 
within the bounds of this restriction entails a right to prevent others from 
unjust hindrances of my freedom. Using coercion to counteract unjust 
hindrances to freedom "is consistent with freedom according to 
universal laws," and thus, any right I have to act in a permissible way "is 
united with the authorization to use coercion against anyone" that 
interferes with my right.234 Having rights only means that use of 
coercion to enforce the right "is entirely compatible with everyone's 
freedom," including the freedom of the person against whom coercion is 
used, "in accordance with universal laws. Thus 'right' ... and 
'authorization to use coercion' mean the same thing.'.235 
When, for example, I legally acquire a possession, I claim entitlement 
to use coercive force to defend my ownership right, at the same time 
acknowledging the legitimacy of all other persons' legitimate claims of 
ownership against me.236 Such claims are possible, however, only in a 
society where laws protect ownership through public legislation, backed 
by coercive power, in civil society .z37 Kant therefore concludes that, as 
an "a priori" Idea of reason, people should participate in a legal system 
"if they ever could (even involuntarily) come into a relationship with 
one another that involves mutual rights,'.238 because it is only within 
such a system that one's ownership can "be established lawfully and 
secured ... by an effective power" that is more than one's own mere 
physical capacity.239 Living in civil society creates a better form of 
freedom than we would have if we relied only on our own personal 
strength to protect ourselves and our belongings by giving us freedom 
232. Kevin Thompson, Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Political Authority, 92 KANT-
STUDIEN 62, 66 (2001). 
233. MAR, supra note 27, at 35 [230). 
234. [d. at 36 [231). 
235. [d. at 37 [232). 
236. Thompson, supra note 232, at 74-75. 
237. MAR, supra note 27, at 65 [256). 
238. [d. at 70 [306). 
239. [d. at 76 [312). 
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under laws that allow for assertion and protection of our rights.24o This, 
in brief, is Kant's "deduction" of civil society, laws, and their coercive 
power as the condition of the possibility of the freedom to act in a world 
where people cannot avoid having contact with one another. 241 
Though this deduction has established the legitimacy of state 
coercion, it leaves open the problem of what types of coercion the state 
may impose on wrongdoers. Because systems of punishment must be 
consistent with dictates of interpersonal morality, they must recognize 
the humanity of the criminal and the victim equally. Punishment 
therefore must inflict on the criminal only the equivalent of what the 
criminal's unlawful act has inflicted on another person,242 and 
punishments must be strictly retributive. Though punishment serves a 
coercive purpose (i.e., deterring would-be criminals from violating laws 
that protect freedom-promoting relationships243), a criminal's guilt is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for a court's imposing a sentence. 
This assures that those criminals who undergo punishment merely 
experience the logical consequence of their decisions to break the law. 
Kant believes that if a legal system were to coerce someone for a reason 
other than his actually having committed a criminal offense (for 
example, to "punish,,244 him in order "to promote some other good for 
the criminal himself or for civil society"), it would be manipulating him 
"merely as a means to the purposes of someone else .... " The innate 
personhood of any individual, even an accused criminal, "protects him 
against such treatment . . .. He must first be found to be deserving of 
punishment before any consideration is given to the utility of this 
punishment for himself or for his fellow citizens. ,,245 
Kant thus accepts punishment as a rationally necessary consequence 
of our enjoying rights in civil society. Punishment is administered as a 
coercive response to the criminal's actions, but does not lessen the 
criminal's moral status because it confirms his humanity and freedom 
along with the humanity and freedom of all other members of civil 
society. Because Kant's theory precludes future-oriented goals such as 
deterrence and rehabilitation from entering into consideration of whether 
to punish someone, the legal system should not pretend to make 
240. fd. at 80-81 [316]. 
241. Thompson, supra note 232, at 76-77. 
242. MAR, supra note 27, at 133 [363]. 
243. See Thomas E. Hill, 1r., Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment, 18 LAW & PHIL. 407, 
430 (1999). 
244. The scare-quotes are placed here to signity that such an activity would not actually be 
punishment because it would not have been imposed in response to a crime. 
245. MAR, supra note 27, at 100 [331]. 
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punishment decisions based on the criminal's potential for reform or his 
likelihood of future misbehavior. Rather, the legal denunciation that 
occurs during conviction and punishment expresses our respect for the 
criminal's worthiness as a rational being by affirming his moral status as 
a responsible person who has acted for a reason?46 
d. Application to Threats in Therapy 
i. Threats as Hostile Acts 
The considerations underlying Kant's justification of punishment 
provide guidance to evaluating laws like Ohio's duty-to-protect statute. 
Making credible threats is a criminal offense, and laws in many 
jurisdictions provide for punishment of individuals who do SO?47 From 
a Kantian standpoint, laws making such an action criminal and 
punishable appear legitimate because uttering a credible threat goes 
beyond being statistically dangerous and therefore poses a risk to 
society. One who threatens simultaneously performs a conscious action 
that really harms another person through fear-induced restriction in that 
other person's freedom. Threats, in other words, can be actions with 
adverse consequences and can therefore occasion a legitimate coercive 
response (i.e., punishment) to the threatener. 
Ohio's duty-to-protect statute deals with a circumstance not covered 
by criminal statutes on threats-the utterance of a threat to someone 
other than the target of the violent action. A response within the context 
of the criminal justice system therefore is not appropriate. Instead, the 
more logical response to a threat not yet carried out might be to 
counteract it somehow. As we have seen earlier, in jurisdictions where 
failure to help others is a criminal offense, the therapist who fails to do 
246. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND 
THE EMOTIONS 179, 198-217 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987). 
247. See. e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (West 2006) (prescribing punishment of up to one year for 
threatening to commit a crime that will cause "death or great bodily injury to another person," that 
conveys "an immediate prospect of execution of the threat," and thereby causes reasonable fear for the 
target's safety); OHIO REV. CODE § 2903.21 (West 2006) (defining the misdemeanor or felony of 
"aggravated menacing" as "knowingly caus[ing] another [person] to believe that the offender will cause 
serious physical harm to" another person, the person's property, or person's fetus or family member). 
See also. e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-505 (Lexis 1999) ("terroristic threat," defined as threat "to 
commit any violent felony with the intent to cause evacuation ... or otherwise to cause serious public 
inconvenience" punishable by three years' imprisonment); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.713 (West 2006) 
(five years' imprisonment for similar activity); MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (2005) (third-degree felony 
to threaten "to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of 
a building ... " or other major inconvenience). 
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something to avert danger might be criminally liable. 
ii. Implications of Not Responding 
Even in jurisdictions that follow the common law tradition of not 
requiring individuals to rescue others, the therapist who hears a patient's 
credible threat would seem to be faced with only one of two choices: 
make some response that would address the threat, or not do so. 
Whatever the Kantian objections might be to taking protective steps 
beyond verbal efforts at persuasion, not trying to do anything creates 
ethical problems, too. First, it is conceivable that failure to do more, 
when one has a legal requirement such as a statutory or court-created 
duty to protect, is tantamount to complicity if the patient carries out the 
threat. Typically, complicity in a criminal offense requires that an 
individual solicit, conspire with, or cause another person to commit the 
offense, or aid or abet another person in committing the offense, or in 
some way ally oneself with the aim of the person committing the 
offense248-which clearly is not the therapist's intent by maintaining 
silence. From a therapeutic standpoint, however, a therapist's failure to 
take a stance against potential violence when it is possible to intervene 
has the psychological effect of involving therapist in the patient's violent 
fantasies and colluding with them. 
This leads to the second ethical problem, which is that in an important 
sense, the therapist who allows a patient to harm someone is failing to 
live up to the commitment the therapist has made to promoting the 
patient's health. As Dr. Gutheil explains: 
248. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE § 2923.03 (Anderson, 2005). "[T]he majority view-
which ... has been adopted under the Model Penal Code-holds that 'traditional definitions of 
accomplice liability demand that [the accessory] in some sort [of way] associate himself with the 
venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action 
to make it succeed.'" Kyong Suk Lee v. Anchorage, 70 P.3d 1110, 1112 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) 
(citing, inter alia, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06). 
In the article that he has prepared for this symposium, Professor Slobogin construes the Model Penal 
Code and case law as potentially making a therapist criminally liable for harm caused by a patient. See 
Christopher Slobogin, Tarasoff as a Duty to Treat: insights from Criminal Law, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming Winter 2006). My reading of the Model Penal Code, however, is consistent with the 
reading in Lee, above. That is, A can be guilty of an offense committed by B, another individual person 
for whom A is legally accountable (MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06( I). But A is legally accountable for the 
conduct of B only if (I) A has caused B, an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct, 
or (2) A is made criminally accountable for B's conduct by the Code or by the law defining the offense, 
or (3) A is an accomplice of B (MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)). Someone who refrains from carrying 
out a legal duty can be deemed an accomplice only if his purpose in refraining was to promote or 
facilitate the offense (MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a)(iii). 
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Because the clinician works, not for the patient, but for healthy side 
of the patient, the use of a Tarasoffwarning may be seen to take place in 
service to that side of the patient that wishes not to harm another person. 
This posture supports a moral justification for a TarasofJ-type warning: 
The therapist acts at the unexpressed "behest" of the patient's healthy 
side. 
* * * 
[P]reventing the patient from harming a victim, though clearly beneficial 
to the victim, is also beneficial to the patient him or herself and fulfills a 
duty; the patient is spared the emotional, legal, and social consequences 
of having harmed another, perhaps while mentally impaired?49 
Implicit in Dr. Gutheil's reference to a patient's "healthy side" is the 
idea that a person's full (and morally relevant) set of desires or 
intentions may be more extensive and complex than what the person 
happens to express at a particular (and perhaps a particularly weak) 
moment. From a Kantian viewpoint, a therapist (along with everyone 
else) is required to respect and promote the humanity of his patient 
(along with everyone else).25o Therapists take on patients not to just 
make them feel better (for in this case, prescribing euphoria-inducing 
drugs would be a perfect treatment), but in the belief that treatment can 
allow patients to achieve legitimate goals such as to function more 
autonomously.251 One could argue, then, that a therapist who fails to 
take available steps to offset a patient's violent plans has failed to fulfill 
the duty to help the patient preserve his own autonomy. 
This last point leads to a final set of considerations. Even if a 
therapist is convinced that it is proper to take one of the extratherapeutic 
courses of action set out in the Ohio duty-to-protect statute, something 
about doing this "feels" wrong. The reason may be that, in an ideal 
therapeutic situation, such actions would be wrong. Kant's ethics tell us 
why-the therapist is interfering with the patient's free action, and 
ideally, this should not occur. But as Professor Korsgaard points out, 
the problem here may be "that morality itself sometimes allows or even 
requires us to do something that from an ideal perspective is wrong." 
249. Gutheil, supra note 2, at 349. 
250. In fact, Kant holds that the duty to treat "humanity as an end in itself' entails the positive 
obligation that "every one endeavours also, so far as in him lies, to further the ends of others. For the 
ends ofa subject who is an end in himself must, if this conception is to have itsfull effect in me, be also, 
as far as possible, my ends." GMS, supra note 27, at 98 [430]. 
251. In Kantian terms, the therapist seeks to advance the patient's "capacities for greater 
perfection which form part of nature's purpose for humanity in our person." /d. at 97-98 [430]. The 
therapist does not make the patient feel better, but promotes the patient's development because, "as a 
rational being," the patient "necessarily wills that all his powers should be developed, since they serve 
him, and are given him, for all sorts of possible ends." /d. at 90 [423]. 
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Though Kant's ethics describe right action in "an ideal system, ... we 
need special principles for dealing with evil.,,252 
iii. Life in the Real World 
Kant's kingdom of ends informs us about what sorts of interactions 
we may have with others in an ideal realm where everyone acts justly. 
But to figure out how to act in the real world, we must contend with the 
fact that not everyone will comply with rules that promote mutual 
freedom. Professor Korsgaard notes, "Certain ongoing natural 
conditions ... prevent the full realization of the ideal state of 
affairs ... the problems of dealing with the seriously ill or mentally 
disturbed, for instance, belong to this category. ,,253 Under such 
circumstances, we tolerate and endorse behavior that falls short of what 
the Kantian ideal would require if such behavior will foster conditions 
that bring matters closer to that ideal. 
In the present context, an extratherapeutic protective action such as an 
involuntary hospitalization temporarily deprives a patient of freedom. 
Yet this action is justified because by averting violence, the action 
brings the world closer to an ideal in which no one improperly impinges 
(through violence or other means) on the freedom of others. The point is 
not merely that hospitalization averts violence, which is something that 
is generically bad,254 but that hospitalization as a liberty-restricting 
interaction is acceptable because if the world had no way to respond to 
threats, threats would create a far greater restriction of liberty because of 
the fear they would introduce.255 Involuntary hospitalization is not 
undertaken lightly because confining someone involuntarily represents a 
departure from ideal conduct and from how we ordinarily think about a 
person's autonomy. As Professor Korsgaard observes, "[r]egret for an 
action we would not do under ideal circumstances seems appropriate 
even if we have done what is clearly the right thing. ,,256 
The notion that we should treat the patient as an end in himself can 
still serve as the therapist's goal even if the therapist takes action 
intended to thwart the patient's efforts. If one of the versions of the 
categorical imperative requires us to regard everyone as a universal 
252. Korsgaard, supra note 222, at 327. 
253. ld. at 342. 
254. This would be a consequentialist argument for involuntary hospitalization, and asserting this 
alone would be arguing for treating the patient as a means (i.e., restricting his freedom to benefit others). 
255. Cf Korsgaard, supra note 222, at 343-46 (discussing the role of a double-level theory in 
dealing with the non-ideal world). 
256. Korsgaard, supra note 222, at 346. 
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legislator, then the therapist must respect the need for the patient to so 
regard others. Letting the patient harm someone else would allow him 
to deny the humanity of another individual and would require ignoring 
that other individual's humanity as well. It seems incoherent to argue 
that a therapist should do nothing to stop a patient's plan to eradicate a 
source of human value out of respect for the patient's humanity.257 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has derived a "major premise" under which the facts 
giving rise to the Tarasoff decision could result in tort liability if a 
therapist failed to take some action to intervene and harm later ensued. 
The major premise has two main parts: first, the patient commits the 
type of action that Poddar committed, namely, make a direct, credible 
threat to harm an identified person; second, the therapist fails to select 
one of several specific, pre-specified responses to the patient's 
statement. Using this major premise to characterize why situations such 
as those of Prosenjit Poddar and Tatiana Tarasoff demand therapist 
intervention has the advantage of being relatively uncontroversial, in 
that the expectations placed upon mental health clinicians conform to 
what several states' statutes and the American Psychiatric Association's 
model statute258 recommend. But if this Article accomplished nothing 
more than justify already existing laws and recommendations, it might 
be little but an empty academic exercise. 
I think, however, that this Article's argument, if correct, has practical 
benefits for how courts and therapists think about what mental health 
professionals do, and potentially, for certain legal and scientific 
problems that remain despite the passage of three decades since 
Tarasoff. 
First, the wording of the Tarasoff ruling259 amounts to a requirement 
that a clinician assess whether a patient will act violently and then 
decide, based on that calculation, whether some further protective action 
is warranted. This requirement, which went beyond what the facts in 
Tarasoff demanded, paved the way for subsequent courts to expect 
mental health professionals to gauge the risk of and take responsibility 
for any (retrospectively) foreseeable harm caused by a patient. The 
problem with this requirement is not, as was once believed, that mental 
257. Cj Korsgaard, supra note 222, at 347 (discussing how the fonnula of humanity creates a 
clear argument against suicide). 
258. Appelbaum et aI., supra note 14, at 827-28. 
259. I here refer to the California Supreme Court's ultimate majority ruling, TarasofJlI. 551 P.2d 
334,340 (Cal. 1976), as well as the portions of the decision discussed supra Section II.C.l.b. 
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health professionals cannot "predict dangerousness." The problem with 
the Tarasoff rule is that it presupposes that assessments of 
dangerousness are yeS-Of-no predictions, whereas what mental health 
clinicians have is the ability to assign persons to different levels of risk. 
To take action based on a level of risk requires, in tum, a judgment 
about what level of risk is sufficient to justify the action. 
But no court has provided guidance as to what this level of risk is, 
and, as a few empirical studies have now shown, homogeneous groups 
of people express irreconcilably broad ranges of opinion about what 
level of risk justifies even a very specific intervention such as 
involuntary hospitalization. This disagreement (along with other 
statistical uncertainties) prevents a clinician from implementing 
decisions by referring to a threshold that designates the probability of 
violence that should justify an intervention-no accepted threshold 
exists. The Tarasoffruling, in requiring therapists to assess future risk 
and to act upon perceptions about that risk, implies use of a decision-
making scheme about which there can be no agreement. What is wrong 
with Tarasoff scientifically is not that therapists cannot make accurate 
judgments about the future, but that they cannot know when to act 
protectively based on their probabilistic judgments about the future. 
Second, Tarasoff rests upon a troubling rationale, which involves 
consequentialist policy decisions articulated by courts. Even if one 
accepts consequentialism as a basis fOf legal decisions, Tarasoff and the 
decisions that have followed it simply insist, rather than prove, that the 
benefits to society of added safety outweigh the costs borne by patients 
in terms of lost privacy, embarrassment, disruption of therapy, and 
involuntary confinement. As a practical matter, three decades have . 
shown that Tarasoffhas not been (as some had feared) a "disaster,,260 for 
mental health treatment, whether Of not society has been made safer by 
making therapists potentially liable for their patients' violence. As a 
moral matter, however, Tarasoff is troubling in its willingness to 
sacrifice the interests of patients fOf the sake of society. The same 
notions of fairness and justice that prevent us from imposing 
confinement on people because they might commit future crimes also 
tell us that undeserving patients should not suffer adverse consequences 
for things they only have a probability of doing. 
Third, the reasons why the APA proposed its legislative solution and 
the rationale for its adoption in several states have centered on the 
practical (and understandable) concerns of mental health professionals. 
260. STONE, supra note 13, at 181. 
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As this Article has explained,261 clinicians have felt that, as defined by 
courts, TarasofJ-type duties were amorphous and overly burdensome. 
Clinicians have therefore sought statutory boundaries on the duty to 
protect, boundaries that tell them when the duty arises (usually, 
following explicit threats toward specific targets) and that define 
specific ways of discharging the duty. Even if legislators take the 
concerns of mental health professionals to heart, however, there is no 
reason that courts will. Across the United States, state supreme courts 
have struck down as unconstitutional numerous legislative efforts at 
"tort reform. ,,262 In Arizona, a law restricting therapist liability to 
situations in which the patient has communicated an explicit threat of 
imminent action and the clinician fails to take reasonable precautions263 
has been held to violate the state constitution because it abrogated the 
common law right to recover for negligence.264 Although some courts in 
other jurisdictions have held that duty-to-protect statutes superseded any 
common law rule,265 the Arizona experience shows that the simple 
existence of a law is no guarantee that courts will accede to the hopes or 
needs of mental health professionals. 
All three of these problems are addressed by this Article's argument 
for specifying the duty to protect as the Ohio statute does. Because the 
duty arises only when patients utter credible threats that they can carry 
261. See supra Part VII. 
262. E.g., State ex reI. Oh. Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999) 
(caps on non-economic and punitive damages violate separation of powers); Knowles v. U.S., 544 
N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1996) ($1 million medical malpractice compensatory damage cap violates substantive 
due process); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1979) ($300,000 limit on damages 
recoverable in medical malpractice actions violates state and federal equal protection guarantees). 
263. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-517.02 (2006). 
264. Little v. All Phoenix S. Cmty. Mental Health CtL, Inc., 919 P.2d 1368 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). 
The court reasoned that common law recognizes a general negligence cause of action, and, under 
Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 775 P.2d 1122 (Ariz. 1989), general negligence includes injury to 
persons who are in the "reasonably foreseeable area of danger," and not just to those whom someone has 
threatened. Under Article 18, section 6 of the Arizona Constitution, a statute may not eliminate a 
common law cause of action. Thus, the court held that the portion of Arizona's duty-to-protect statute 
requiring a threat was unconstitutional. 
265. Tabor v. Veteran's Admin. ex rei. U.S., 198 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table 
decision) (no liability because Tennessee statute required an actual threat); Riley v. United Health Care 
of Hardin, Inc., 165 F.3d 28 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (no specific threat: statute 
superceded previous common law duty). In other cases, courts have ruled in such a way that duty-to-
protect statutes have afforded therapists some protection, without ruling on whether those statutes 
supercede common law. See, e.g., Jenks v. Brown, 557 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (no need to 
use a common-law theory of negligence by defendant, because the patient had not "communicated 
[any] ... threat of physical violence against plaintiff'), and Swan v. Wedgwood Christian Youth & 
Family Serv., Inc, 583 N.W.2d 719, 724-25 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the court had no need 
to decide whether a common-law duty survived the enactment of Michigan's statute because the 
defendant never had reason to foresee danger to the plaintiffs decedent). 
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out, the statute takes therapists out of the violence prediction business. 
Although the purpose of doing this was to relieve clinicians of an 
onerous burden, the statute also eliminates the need for clinicians to 
make a level-of-risk decision about which there is and can be no 
practical guidance. By requiring that a patient's action be the trigger for 
the protective duty and by specifying response to the patient's action, the 
statute treats patients as human beings. The statute tells therapists to 
regard their patients as making choices that have consequences, rather 
than requiring therapists to regard patients as sources of statistical risk. 
The statute respects patients as free actors whose expressed intentions 
are taken seriously and can trigger responses from other free actors. 
Under the statute, these responses include actions by therapists to 
counteract patients' expressed intent to violate other human beings' 
freedom. 
Courts in some jurisdictions may construe common law or state 
constitutional provisions as encompassing a duty to protect that must 
survive legislative complete abrogation. However, jurisdictions need 
not repeat the scientific flaws and moral problems inherent in the 
liability-creating major premise created by Tarasoff. That is, 
jurisdictions can construe a common-law duty to protect as arising in the 
fact situation presented in Tarasoff, where a patient uttered a credible 
threat to harm a specific individual, without going further and stating 
that therapists must make predictions about every patient's likelihood of 
violence. 
In this Article, I have emphasized the benefits of Ohio's duty-to-
protect statute in a way that I hope will appeal to legislators, courts, and 
those who affect the thinking of these decision-makers. But mental 
health clinicians have something to gain from statutes such as the one 
enacted in Ohio that goes beyond having a clearly delineated duty and 
liability protection: a better understanding of the role of studies of 
violence prediction. As I have argued here and elsewhere,266 in most 
cases, violence prediction techniques are not accurate enough to affect 
decisions in clinical management because the differences between 
patients with "low" and "high" risk usually are not big enough to justify 
treating them differently. 
This does not mean that mental health professionals should not 
conduct studies of violence prediction or be interested in such studies' 
results, nor does it mean that clinicians should not make interventions 
that reduce violence. For example, studies examining post-
266. Douglas Mossman, Commentary: Assessing the Risk of Violence - Are "Accurate" 
Predictions Useful?, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 272, 280 (2000). 
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hospitalization violence suggest that nonadherence to medication and 
(especially) substance abuse are risk factors for aggressive behavior 
during the months after hospital discharge.267 Studies have also 
confirmed that-as was true in many of the cases described in this 
article-friends and family members are those most likely to become 
victims of violence by psychiatric patients.268 It has been difficult to 
demonstrate whether treatment or other risk management strategies 
actually reduce violence. However, studies have shown that outpatient 
commitment and assiduous community follow-up may improve 
outpatient outcomes and increase the chances that patients will continue 
their treatment after hospitalization,269 and accumulating research is 
indicating that the newer, "atypical" antipsychotic drugs may reduce 
aggression in persons with schizophrenia.270 These and similar findings 
over the past decade support the belief that continuing to study violence 
committed by individuals with mental problems may "augment our 
understanding of the risk factors for violent behavior" and "improve the 
ability of clinicians, courts, and criminal justice staff to make informed 
decisions about treatment.,,271 
But hopefully, all clinicians believe that better treatment for patients 
is desirable whether or not such improvements reduce the risk of 
violence. Effective treatment and helping to assure that patients receive 
it are good things because they enhance patients' autonomy. A 
clinician's well-founded belief that a patient needs and deserves certain 
267. Marvin S. Swartz et aI., Violence and Severe Mental Illness: The Effects of Substance Abuse 
and Nonadherence to Medication, ISS AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 155 (1998); Henry J. Steadman et aI., supra 
note 86; see also Gerald Melnick et aI., Use of the COVR in Violence Risk Assessment, 57 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 142 (2006) (reanalysis of MacArthur data shows correlation between violence and intensity of 
substance use). 
268. Steadman et aI., supra note 86; Kenneth Tardiff et aI., A Prospective Study of Violence by 
Psychiatric Patients after Hospital Discharge, 48 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 48 (1997); Sue E. Estroff et 
aI., Risk Reconsidered: Targets of Violence in the Social Networks of People with Serious Psychiatric 
Disorders, 33 SOC. PSYCHIATRY PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 95 (1998, Suppl. 1). 
269. Virginia A. Hiday & T. L. Scheid-Cook, A Follow-up of Chronic Patients Committed to 
Outpatient Treatment, 40 Hosp. COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 52 (1989); Marvin S. Swartz et aI., Can 
Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Reduce Hospital Recidivism?: Findings from a Randomized Trial 
with Severely Mentally III Individuals, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1968 (1999). 
270. Jeffrey W. Swanson et aI., Effectiveness of Atypical Antipsychotic Medications in Reducing 
Violent Behavior among Persons with Schizophrenia in Community-based Treatment, 30 
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 3 (2004); Jeffrey W. Swanson et aI., Reducing Violence Risk in Persons with 
Schizophrenia: Olanzapine Versus Risperidone, 65 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 1666 (2004) (in "real 
world" conditions, olanzapine is superior to risperidone in reducing violence risk, in part because of 
better adherence); Eric Elbogen et aI., Violence Risk Management and Adherence to Treatment With 
Atypical Antipsychotics in Schizophrenia, 24 BEHAV. HEALTH MGMT. SI, S2-S3 (Nov'/Dec. 2004) 
(explaining studies and pharmacological theory of drugs' anti-aggressive action). 
271. Melnick et aI., supra note 267, at 142. 
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treatments to function better is sufficient grounds by itself to motivate 
the clinician to see that a patient gets those treatments and to justify 
making arrangements for them, and the potential of such treatments to 
reduce the patient's violence risk should be an at-most-small factor in a 
clinician's decision-making. 
Studies of violence prediction may alert clinicians to specific risk 
factors that can become the focus of treatment. 272 In the world of 
clinical mental health care, however, the purpose of learning such risk 
factors is that they matter to patients' well-being, and not because they 
will allow clinicians to make better predictions. Sound clinical 
interventions may be tum out to be socially useful because they reduce 
violence potential. But for mental health professionals, protecting the 
public should be an incidental result of the autonomy-enhancing effects 
of effective psychiatric treatment. F or clinicians, the lesson of this 
article should be that a proper framing of the duty to protect will allow 
them to refocus their attention on providing effective treatment rather 
than on making predictions about violence. 
272. As has resulted from research on factors increasing the risk of suicide. See, e.g., Richard C. 
W. Hall et aI., Suicide Risk Assessment: A Review of Risk Factorsfor Suicide in 100 Patients Who Made 
Severe Suicide Attempts; Evaluation of Suicide Risk in a Time of Managed Care, 40 PSYCHOSOMATICS 
18, 18 (1999) ("Severe anxiety, panic attacks, a depressed mood, ... were excellent predictors of 
suicidal behavior"); Katie A. Busch et aI., Clinical Correlates of Inpatient Suicide, 64 J. CLINICAL 
PSYCHIATRY 14, 14 (2003) (severity of anxiety and agitation may help identify patients at acute risk for 
suicide and indicate possible treatment interventions). 
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APPENDIX I 
The expected utility, EU, of a decision is: 
[AI] EU= (BR)(TPR)(UTP) + (BR)(I-TPR)(UFN) 
+ (l-BR)(FPR)(UFP) + (l-BR)(I-FPR)(UTN), 
where BR, TPR, and FPR have the same meanings as in Table 1, and 
UTP, UFN, UFP, and UTN are the utilities of true positive, false negative, 
false positive, and true negative outcomes, respectively. 
From Equation 1 in the text, setting B = 1, 
[A2] ZTPR = ZFPR + A. 
Because ZTPR and ZFPR are the normal deviates of TPR and FPR, 
[A3] TPR = <l>(ZTPR) = <l>(ZFPR + A) and FPR = <I>(ZFPR), 
where <1>( • ) is the cumulative normal distribution function: 
y /2 
[A4] <l>(y)= ~ Je-2 dt. 
'" 27r -00 
It is customary to assign utilities values between 0 (for the worst) and 1 
(for the best) outcomes. Let us assume that TP and TN outcomes-
correct identifications of violent and nonviolent persons-are equally 
good. Setting UTP = UTN = 1, Equation A 1 becomes 
[AS] EU= (BR)(TPR) + (BR)(I-TPR)(UFN) 
+ (l-BR)(FPR)(UFP) + (I-BR)(I-FPR). 
We now differentiate Equation AS with respect to ZFPR: 
[A6] aEU 1 (1- U FN )(BR)e + 
az FPR - .J 27r 2 2 _ ZFPR _ ZFPR 
U FP (1-BR)e 2 -(1-BR)e 2 
To find the value of ZFPR that maximizes EU, we set this derivative 
equal to 0, then rearrange terms: 
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[A7] e (1- BR) (1 - V FP) 
--~-= 
_ Z}PR BR 
e 2 
Expanding the left side of Equation A 7, and taking the natural logarithm 
of both sides, 
-AZ _£ =In ((1-BR) (1-V FP)) 
[A8] FPR 2 BR (1-V FN) 
When Equation A8 is solved for ZFPR and A = I, we obtain 
[A9] Z =~-ln ((l-BR) (1-V FP)) 
FPR 2 C BR (1-V ) 
FN • 
Figure 5 shows that the central 80 percent of the time periods 
endorsed by mental health professionals lie between three and 816 days. 
Suppose an individual is indifferent between being attacked and 
undergoing a three-day hospitalization, and assume further that the result 
of an emergency commitment is three days. This means that UFP (the 
utility of a false-positive diagnosis of "violent") is the same as the UFN 
(the utility of a false-negative diagnosis of "nonviolent"), so that UFP = 
UFN = o. Suppose further, as Figure 4 indicates, that the base rate of 
violence (BR) is 10 percent, or 0.1. Plugging these values into Equation 
A9, we obtain the result ZFPR = -1.7. For the violence prediction 
instrument depicted in Figure 4, where the mean score of nonviolent 
persons is 45 and the standard deviation of their scores is 10, this is 
equivalent to a score of 62. 
Suppose that an individual is indifferent between being attacked 
and undergoing a 816-day hospitalization. For this individual, the worst 
outcome clearly is a false-negative diagnosis of "nonviolent," so we 
assign UFNthe value ofO. How should we assign a value of UFP for this 
individual? Because an 816-day hospitalization is 272 times as long as a 
three-day emergency hospitalization, we can estimate roughly that this 
individual is indifferent between (a) a lottery in which he has a 1/272 = 
0.00368 chance of being hospitalized for 816 days, and a (1 - 1/272) = 
0.99632 chance of no hospitalization, and (b) undergoing a three-day 
hospitalization. For this individual, therefore, UFP = 0.99632. Plugging 
these values in Equation A9 gives us ZFPR = 3.9; for the violence 
prediction instrument depicted in Figure 4, this is equivalent to a score 
of 16. 
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APPENDIX II 
In Figure 4, the scores of violent and nonviolent subjects are depicted 
as "bell-shaped" or normal distributions. The usual way to express the 





where X is the value at which the function is evaluated, and f1 and (J are 
the mean and standard deviation of the distribution. In Figure 4, f1 = 55 
for the violent subjects, f1 = 45 for the nonviolent subjects, and for both 
groups, (J = 10. 
Let BR equal the base rate of violence in the population (which, for 
this example, is set at 0.1), and let p equal the probability of violence 
selected by the judge as justifying hospitalization. Then the cut-off or 
value of FVT corresponding to p will be that value of the FVT where the 














Canceling out common factors, taking the natural logarithm of both 
sides, and rearranging terms in Equation All, one finds: 
In 
p (1- BR) (FVT - 45)2 (FVT - 55)2 
[A 12] - -'------'--
(1- p) BR 2(10)2 2(10)2 
Expanding and further simplifying: 
[A13] 200 In p (1- BR) = 20FVT -100 
(1- p) BR 
Solving for FVT, one obtains: 
[A14] FVT = 50 + 10 In p (1- BR) 
(1- p) BR 
To find the FVT score that corresponds to p when the base rate is BR, 
one simply plugs the appropriate values into Equation A14. When BR = 
0.1, P = 0.01 corresponds to a FVT score of 26. If P = 0.56, the FVT 
score will be 74. 
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